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ABSTRACT 
This Article provides a new perspective on the image of marriage that 
has emerged from the same-sex marriage debate. However flawed, the 
procreation rationale has enjoyed overwhelming success in recent same-
sex marriage litigation.  However absurd, the idea that same-sex 
marriage is a species of counterfeit has become so commonplace in the 
rhetoric surrounding same-sex marriage that it nearly escapes our notice. 
This Article argues that while neither the procreation rationale nor 
contemporary counterfeiting rhetoric makes much sense when 
considered in isolation, both make a great deal of sense when considered 
in concert.  To that end, this Article looks at the historical casting of 
non-normative intimate relationships and reproductive practices 
(sodomy and miscegenation) in subversive economic terms (counterfeit) 
in order to explain the highly influential procreation rationale for same-
sex marriage prohibitions.  It ultimately suggests that the image of 
same-sex marriage (and same-sex reproduction) as a fraud that has 
emerged from the same-sex marriage debate, and from recent same-sex 
marriage litigation, brings us back full circle to sodomy and links up 
with the imagery of disgust that once surrounded sodomy regulation and 
the legal treatment of sexual orientation minorities through Lawrence v. 
Texas. It also suggests that the law’s procreationist vision of marriage 
might be viewed as at once hopelessly restrictive and daringly 
liberating.  
 
1 This Article, including text and footnotes (excluding Abstract and Contents), is 29,982 
words. 
2 Visiting Associate Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University, School of Law; Ph.D., 
Princeton University; J.D., Yale Law School; B.A., Barnard College, Columbia University.  
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3INTRODUCTION 
From the metaphor of the closet3 to that of the three dollar bill, 
tropes4 of fraud, deception, and mimicry seem to trip off the tongue 
when the subject of a queer sexual orientation arises.5 Over the last 
decade, and particularly within the last three years, marriage 
traditionalists have increasingly relied on a particular rhetoric of 
deception—that of counterfeiting—to convey what in their view is a 
species of public fraud: same-sex marriage and its close approximations, 
civil unions and domestic partnerships.  Counterfeiting rhetoric has 
become so common, in fact, in the legal controversy over same-sex 
marriage that its sheer pervasiveness nearly renders it invisible.  
In May 2003, Marilyn Musgrave, United States Representative 
and co-sponsor of the original Federal Marriage Amendment (FMA), 
publicly declared that a federal marriage amendment was necessary 
because “[t]he traditional values Americans hold are being traded in for 
counterfeit marital unions.”6 Representative Musgrave was not the first 
person involved in the same-sex marriage debate to coin the analogy 
between same-sex marriage and counterfeiting.  Rather, its vintage in 
that debate may be traced at least as far back as the mid-90s, when 
Robert Knight, Director of the Concerned Women of America’s Culture 
and Family Institute, deployed the counterfeiting trope to describe same-
sex marriage7 and when Gary Bauer, former President of the Family 
 
3 For the metaphor of the closet as applied to sexual orientation minorities among other groups, 
see EVE KOSOFSKY SEDGWICK, EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE CLOSET (1990); Kenji Yoshino, Suspect 
Symbols: The Literary Argument for Heightened Scrutiny for Gays, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1753, 
1793-1816 (1996).   
4 A “trope” denotes the “turning” of a word away from its original meaning toward a new 
meaning that is not immediately obvious.  See infra note _____, and accompanying text.  The 
idea of “queer as counterfeit” is one such trope that this Article discusses.   
5 The category of “queer” is by no means self-defining. This Article will demonstrate that 
“queer” at once connotes passing and deception (e.g., queer/counterfeit currency) and a resolute 
refusal to pass and to deceive (e.g., queer as ostentation).  In this sense, “queer” connotations 
partake of the same double bind in which the law routinely places sexual orientation minorities: 
simultaneously passing too much and not enough.  For the latter sense of queer, see Kenji 
Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L. J. 769, 839 (2002).  For some queer theorists, the “semantic 
clout” and “political efficacy” of the very category of queer follow from its “resistance to 
definition.”  ANNAMARIE JAGOSE, QUEER THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 2 (1996).  
6 Cheryl Wetzstein, Bill To Define Marriage Tried Again in House as Two States Mull Cases,
WASH. TIMES (May 26, 2003).   
7 David W. Dunlap, Some States Trying To Stop Gay Marriages Before They Start, N.Y. TIMES,
4Research Council, testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee, in 
favor of the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), that same-sex 
marriage is “a counterfeit that will do great harm to the special status 
that the genuine institution [of marriage] has earned.”8 Nor, indeed, 
would Representative Musgrave be the last to link subversive 
numismatic practices with non-normative sexual and affective 
relationships.  More recently, counterfeiting has become a routine way 
to describe same-sex marriage and its imitative approximations, civil 
unions and domestic partnerships, as well as the ‘artificial’ reproduction 
that occurs in the context of a same-sex relationship.9
Where does this counterfeiting language come from and what 
does it signify?  More important, what work is it doing in the legal 
controversy over the extension of marital rights to same-sex couples?  
On one level, to compare same-sex marriage to a counterfeit makes 
sense in light of the fact that sexual orientation minorities and 
counterfeit articles share a common language. The federal criminal 
statute that targets counterfeiting, 18 U.S.C.A. § 472,10 imposes 
penalties on those who either “pass” or attempt to “pass” counterfeit 
currency in the United States.  With respect to sexual orientation 
minorities, Professor Kenji Yoshino has amply documented just how 
pervasive the language and ideology of “passing” is for gays and 
lesbians.11 Below, I will return to this idea that same-sex couples are 
like counterfeit because artificial reproductive technology is increasingly 
allowing them to pass for straight—part of the reason, I submit, why 
procreation has suddenly become the dominant rationale in same-sex 
marriage litigation today. 
At the same time, however, to compare same-sex marriage to a 
counterfeit makes about as much sense as does the claim that same-sex 
marriage will lead us ineluctably down the slippery slope to incest.  In a 
prior article, I argued that the slippery slope trope, “from same-sex 
marriage to incest,” does not hold up because incest is definitionally 
imprecise—just where is it that we are slipping to when we slip into 
 
1995 WL 3812247 (Mar. 15, 1995) (remarks of Robert Knight).   
8 U.S. CONG. TEST., 1996 WL 387291 (F.D.C.H.) (July 11, 1996) (testimony of Gary L. Bauer).  
9 See infra Part II, passim.
10 18 U.S.C.A. § 472 (2001).   
11 Yoshino, supra note 4, at 814-36 (documenting the cultural and legal contexts in which 
passing norms occur).    
5incest12—and because in many ways we have already slipped.13 Here, I 
turn instead to the counterfeiting trope that legal actors, among others, 
have recently deployed to describe the public fraud that, in their view, 
same-sex marriage represents.  Like the slippery slope to incest trope, 
the counterfeiting analogy to same-sex marriage does not hold up 
because, quite simply, same-sex marriage is not duping the public and 
same-sex couples are not, at least technically, passing for straight when 
they marry each other.  Rather, that relationship is, for many, more akin 
to the obscene: “I know it when I see it.”14 As with the imprecision 
surrounding the incest trope, the descriptive inaccuracy of recent 
counterfeiting rhetoric invites us to question just what is fueling that 
rhetoric—and, more important, the laws that have flowed from it. 
This Article argues that the counterfeiting analogy to same-sex 
relations, while on its face illogical, is intimately tied to concerns about 
sodomy and same-sex procreation.  It will show that the counterfeiting 
analogy that has emerged in the legal discourse surrounding rights for 
gays and lesbians—explicitly in the policy rhetoric and implicitly in 
case law since as early as Romer v. Evans,15 where an image of the 
‘homosexual-as-counterfeiter’ surfaces in Justice Scalia’s dissent—not 
only makes a great deal of sense on its own, but also helps to make 
sense of the current legal treatment of same-sex couples in the marriage 
context.  Early-modern historical and literary sources reveal that the 
counterfeiting analogy has a lineage that antecedes its more recent 
appearance in the same-sex marriage debate.  As with the current 
casting of same-sex relationships as counterfeit, the counterfeiting 
analogy was once deployed to signify non-procreative sex (sodomy) and 
‘dangerous’ procreation (miscegenation).  A look at that history is 
useful, and necessary, for two reasons.  First, it provides a lens through 
which to view, and better understand, the claim that “same-sex marriage 
is a counterfeit”—a statement which on its own fails to explain how a 
relationship that is regularly characterized as a form of flaunting has 
suddenly become a deception perpetrated on the public. Second, and 
 
12 Courtney Megan Cahill, Same-Sex Marriage, Slippery Slope Rhetoric, and the Politics of 
Disgust: A Critical Perspective on Contemporary Family Discourse and the Incest Taboo, 99 
NORTHWESTERN UNIV. L. REV. 1543, 1562 (2005).   
13 See id. at 1566. 
14 Jacobellis v. State of Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).   
15 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
6more important, it helps to explain the highly influential, and hugely 
successful, procreation rationale for same-sex marriage prohibitions.  In 
short, the counterfeiting analogy, and the ample history behind it, 
clarifies just why procreation is the dominant concern in same-sex 
marriage litigation today.16 
Until recently, it had appeared that the procreation rationale—the 
argument that same-sex couples cannot legally marry because they 
cannot sexually procreate with each other—was in desuetude, no longer 
“advanced seriously by states or taken seriously by courts.”17 Even just 
a brief glance at the state reporters, however, reveals that the procreation 
rationale—or at least a version of it—is very much alive.  In early July, 
the New York Court of Appeals upheld that state’s same-sex marriage 
prohibition on the basis of procreation;18 in late July, the Supreme Court 
of Washington did the same.19 Both courts were merely following in the 
footsteps of courts in other states that have similarly held that 
procreation is a constitutionally relevant factor when determining who 
may, and who may not, legally marry.20 To be sure, the current version 
of the procreation rationale has a kinder, gentler face than that of its 
predecessor—a transformation that I discuss below.  Nevertheless, the 
crux of the argument is still the same: because same-sex couples cannot 
sexually produce offspring with each other, same-sex marriage 
prohibitions are constitutional.  
The recent resurgence of the procreation rationale has stumped 
commentators and (some) judges alike, both of whom have dismissed it 
as absurd and reminiscent of the same animus that the Court in Romer 
held was an impermissible basis for laws under even rational basis 
review.21 They have queried: What does the procreation rationale mean 
 
16 See, e.g., Dale Carpenter, Bad Arguments Against Gay Marriage, 7 FLA. COAST. L. REV. 181, 
193 (2005) (“The procreation argument enjoys great currency in academic and legal discussions 
of gay marriage. Indeed, it is probably the most common argument against gay marriage in these 
circles”); William C. Duncan, The State Interests in Marriage, 2 AVE MARIA L. REV. 153, 154 
(2004) (same).   
17 Peter Cicchino, Reason and the Rule of Law: Should Bare Assertions of “Public Morality” 
Qualify as Legitimate Governmental Interests for the Purposes of Equal Protection Review?, 87 
GEO. L.J. 139, 151 (1998).  
18 See Hernandez v. Robles, 2006 WL 1835429, 2006 N.Y. Slip Op. 05239 (N.Y. Jul 6, 2006).  
19 See Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d 963 (Wash. 2006).   
20 See infra notes ______, and accompanying text.  
21 517 U.S. 620 (1996).  
7for cross-sex couples who cannot, or do not want to, sexually 
reproduce?22 How does it affect adopted children and their adoptive 
families?23 Given its emphasis on biological anatomy, doesn’t it hew 
perilously close to gender discrimination?24 This Article argues that 
these criticisms are missing what the procreation rationale is really all 
about: the prevention of fraud.  It proposes that the success of that 
rationale in recent same-sex marriage litigation is better understood in 
light of the counterfeiting rhetoric that has also emerged—alongside the 
procreation rationale, it turns out—from the recent same-sex marriage 
debate.  While neither the counterfeiting analogy nor the procreation 
rationale makes much, if any, sense when viewed in isolation, they both 
begin to make a lot more sense when viewed as a unit. Specifically, the 
historic association between counterfeiting and sodomy, and 
counterfeiting and miscegenation, clarifies what is fraudulent about 
same-sex marriage: the apparent legitimacy, or “counterfeit equality,”25 
that it would confer on intra-relationally non-procreative couples who 
could then “pass”—like a counterfeit coin (or a mixed-race 
individual)—for the so-called ‘real’ thing.  Considered in this light, the 
procreation rationale begins to make more sense.  Whereas procreation 
alone might not be a rational basis by which to sustain a same-sex 
marriage prohibition, the prevention of fraud surely is. 
This Article will proceed as follows.  The first two Parts analyze 
the procreation rationale and counterfeiting rhetoric, respectively, in 
order to set the stage for Part III and Part IV’s more substantive analysis 
of the relationship between them.  Part I summarizes the evolution of 
the procreation rationale that states have offered in support of same-sex 
marriage prohibitions.  In addition, it maintains that pre-existing 
criticism of that rationale by jurists and commentators fails to consider 
the extent to which the procreation justification reflects a belief that 
same-sex marriage, and same-sex procreation, are a species of fraud.  
Part II then provides an overview of the counterfeiting trope that has 
 
22 See infra notes ______, and accompanying text.  
23 See, e.g., Richard F. Storrow, Rescuing Children From the Marriage Movement: The Case 
Against Marital Status Discrimination and Assisted Reproduction, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 305 
(2006).   
24 See, e.g., Kenji Yoshino, Too Good For Marriage, NEW YORK TIMES (July 14, 2006). 
25 See infra note ______ (remarks of Professor Douglas Kmiec).   
8been deployed by marriage traditionalists to describe civil unions and 
same-sex marriage, and exposes the logical inconsistencies of that trope 
as applied to both.   
Parts III and IV contend that while neither the counterfeiting 
trope nor the procreation rationale makes much sense when considered 
separately, they both begin to make a great deal of sense when 
considered together.  Here, I argue that counterfeiting is a single analogy 
that reflects the two procreative concerns that are currently shoring up 
same-sex marriage prohibitions: to wit, a fear of fraudulent (non-
procreative) sex and fraudulent families that pass for the real thing.  In 
order to better understand the counterfeiting analogy—as well as how 
sodomy and the families of same-sex partners can properly be thought 
of as fraudulent—Part III explores in greater detail the historical linking 
of subversive sexual/reproductive relationships (sodomy, 
miscegenation) and counterfeiting in legal and non-legal sources.  Part 
IV is both narrow and broad in scope.  First, and more narrowly, it uses 
the history surveyed in Part III to explain the role that procreation is 
playing in the same-sex marriage debate today.  Second, and more 
broadly, it uses that history to tell a much larger story about sex fraud.  
The history behind the counterfeiting trope clarifies what is truly 
problematic about same-sex marriage and same-sex procreation—the 
fraud which the academic commentary has overlooked.  It also shows 
that the current framing of same-sex marriage as a counterfeit represents 
but a single iteration in a much larger, and much longer, story about 
‘homosexual’ fraud.  This Part will show how in some very real sense 
recent same-sex marriage litigation is repeating the history of sodomy 
regulation—it’s just that the swindler has replaced the sodomite as the 
explicit focal point of concern and disgust for private acts is being 
channeled as outrage over public fraud—a rhetorical transformation 
from disgust (over private acts) to outrage (over public fraud) that, in 
turn, attempts to render discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation 
legally defensible after Lawrence v. Texas. History shows us, however, 
just how much swindlers and sodomites have in common and just how 
much the procreation rationale is about sodomy—or, more accurately, 
sodomites.  
Part V, which is more normative in scope, maintains that we 
might view the counterfeiting analogy and the procreation rationale as at 
once restrictive and liberating.  On the one hand, both continue to place 
9sexual orientation minorities in the proverbial double bind that has 
characterized the law’s treatment of that class since even before Bowers 
v. Hardwick,26 where the Supreme Court, as Janet Halley observes, 
rhetorically duplicates the double bind in a way that ultimately places 
same-sex ‘sodomites’ in a double bind.27 Whereas the law routinely 
faults gays and lesbians for not covering (or passing) enough, the 
counterfeiting analogy and the procreation rationale curiously fault those 
same individuals for covering (or passing) too much—and, in the 
process, for perpetrating a fraud upon the public.  On the other hand, 
however, both the counterfeiting analogy and the procreation rationale 
provide an opportunity to reassess the central role that the state plays in 
creating and maintaining the value of cross-sex marriage as an original 
form, and to explore the productive possibilities of imitative 
performance more generally.  As several notable queer and other 
postmodern theorists have shown, imitation of an allegedly original 
form—be it gender or marriage—has the power to throw the ontological 
primacy of that form into question.28 
This Article begins by asking a few relatively simple questions.  
First, why have same-sex couples been accused of committing a fraud 
when the relationship in question, same-sex marriage, is open, obvious, 
and so often characterized as a form of flaunting?  Second, why have 
courts upheld same-sex marriage prohibitions on the basis of a rationale 
as wispy and weightless as procreation?  Understanding the history and 
theory behind the rhetorical linking of sexual relationships and 
subversive economic practices helps to clarify not only how same-sex 
marriage is like counterfeiting, but also what is doing some of the work 
to shore up the procreation rationale for same-sex marriage prohibitions. 
 However, simply because the counterfeiting analogy might make sense 
in theory, does not mean that it is immune from criticism.  
Counterfeiting rhetoric is not only descriptively inaccurate, but also 
perpetuates the vicious double bind which sexual orientation minorities 
know only too well.  While same-sex marriage proponents might put the 
analogy to positive use by exploring the productive possibilities of 
imitation, they should at the same time remain wary of a comparison 
 
26 478 U.S. 186 (1986).  
27 See Janet E. Halley, Reasoning About Sodomy: Act and Identity In and After Bowers v. 
Hardwick, 79 VA. L. REV. 1721, 1748 (1993).   
28 See infra Part V.B, passim.
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that perpetuates the same double bind that supports discriminatory 
treatment under the law.   
 
I. SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND THE PROCREATION 
RATIONALE: A HISTORY AND CRITIQUE 
In 1998, Peter Cicchino remarked that “[t]he argument from 
procreation, that same-sex relationships will bring about the decline of 
the nation through underpopulation, no longer seems to be either 
advanced seriously by states or taken seriously by courts.”29 However, a 
survey of state and federal cases that have recently addressed the 
constitutionality of same-sex marriage prohibitions reveals that the 
procreation rationale for those prohibitions is in the ascendant—and, 
indeed, doing most of the work to insulate them from successful 
constitutional attack.   
The ongoing success of the procreation rationale requires a close 
examination of what is driving that rationale as well as of the 
fundamental assumptions on which it rests.  Section A summarizes the 
trajectory of the procreation rationale for same-sex marriage 
prohibitions through its most recent appearance in a series of cases 
involving state and federal constitutional challenges to those 
prohibitions. Section B then discusses the major criticisms of that 
rationale offered by legal commentators and by some courts in order to 
highlight a point that they have missed and that Parts III and IV will 
more fully develop, namely, that the procreation justification is really all 
about the prevention of fraud.  
 
A. The Evolution of the Procreation Rationale: From Sterile 
Non-Procreators to Superior Procreators 
 
1. Procreation Rationale: “Preservation-Through-
Transformation”30 
The evolution of the procreation rationale for same-sex marriage 
 
29 Cicchino, supra note _____, at 151.  
30 Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 
2117, 2119 (1996); see also Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The 
Evolving Form of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1113 (1997).   
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prohibitions over the last thirty-five years vividly illustrates what 
Professor Reva Siegel has referred to as a process of “preservation-
through-transformation,” that is, the process by which legal actors 
abandon the “justificatory rhetoric” of an older, contested “status 
regime” in favor of “new . . . reasons to protect” that regime.31 
According to Siegel, the justificatory rhetoric that traditionally 
supported status hierarchies based on sex and race has evolved in such a 
way so as to assume a kinder, gentler face—a rhetorical transformation 
that has, in turn, allowed for the continuation or preservation of those 
same status hierarchies.32 In her seminal piece, Siegel focuses on the 
evolution of the law’s treatment of (marital) domestic violence and on 
the extent to which that evolution—or transformation—has worked to 
preserve a pre-existing hierarchy based on gender within marriage.33 
In this Section, I turn instead to the evolution of the procreation 
rationale for same-sex marriage prohibitions and on the extent to which 
that transformation has worked to preserve a pre-existing hierarchy 
based on sexual orientation with respect to who might enter into a 
marital relationship.  The ‘cross-sex procreation is necessary to 
propagate the species’ argument has ceded to more innocuous-sounding 
procreation rhetoric that ironically casts sexual orientation minorities in 
a more positive light than their cross-sex counterparts.  Nevertheless, 
and partly because current justificatory rhetoric sounds more 
complimentary to gays and lesbians than did prior procreationist 
rhetoric, the pre-existing status hierarchy that excludes same-sex 
couples from marriage has remained largely in place.   
 
2. Procreation Rationale: Evolution 
 
During the early same-sex marriage litigation in the 1970s, 
courts routinely adverted to the traditional version of the procreation 
rationale in sustaining those prohibitions against a range of state and 
federal constitutional challenges.  In most of those cases, the procreation 
rationale appeared alongside the strict definitional approach to marriage, 
that is, the circular argument that marriage is by definition a civil 
 
31 Siegel, The Rule of Love, supra note _____ at 2179.  
32 See id.
33 See id. at 1119.  
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contract between a man and a woman.34 In the process, sexual 
procreation—that is, both the ability and the capacity to procreate 
sexually—became the critical feature that distinguished same-sex 
relations from the cross-sex paradigm of reproduction.   
In the first case to uphold the constitutionality of a same-sex 
marriage prohibition, Baker v. Nelson,35 the Supreme Court of 
Minnesota cited biblical authority and Supreme Court precedent, 
respectively, when it observed that “[t]he institution of marriage as a 
union of man and woman, uniquely involving the procreation and 
rearing of children within family, is as old as the book of Genesis,”36 
and, quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma, that “[m]arriage and procreation are 
fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race.”37 The 
Baker court’s linking of marriage and a certain kind of procreation—
presumably that of the sexual variety—through Skinner quickly became 
authority for courts first considering the constitutionality of same-sex 
marriage prohibitions in the 1970s.  Thus, in Singer v. Hara,38 the 
Washington Court of Appeals reasoned that the state’s refusal to grant a 
marriage license to two males was “not based upon [their] status as 
males” (and therefore in violation of that state’s equal rights 
amendment) but rather “upon the state’s recognition that our society as a 
whole views marriage as the appropriate and desirable forum for 
procreation and the rearing of children.”39 The court at once made clear 
that by “appropriate and desirable forum for procreation” its focus was 
not so much on the kind of family that a child would be born into but 
rather on the kind of parents who were having (or who could have) a 
child in the first place—namely, those who were biologically equipped 
to reproduce sexually with each other.  As the court remarked: “The fact 
remains that marriage exists as a protected legal institution primarily 
because of societal values associated with the propagation of the human 
 
34 For this strict definitional approach, see Adams v. Howerton, 486 F. Supp. 1119, 1123 n.2 
(C.D. Cal. 1980) (“The dictionary definition of the term ‘spouse’ is "a husband or wife; either 
member of a married couple spoken of in relation to the other”), aff’d, 673 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir. 
1982); Anonymous v. Anonymous, 67 Misc. 2d 982, 325 N.Y.S.2d 499 (Sup. Ct. 1971) (same). 
35 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971), appeal dismissed for want of substantial federal question,
409 U.S. 810 (1972).   
36 Id. at 186.  
37 Id. (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)).   
38 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. App.. 1974).   
39 Id. at 1195.  
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race . . . . [I]t is apparent that no same-sex couple offers the possibility 
of the birth of children by their union.”40 
Courts hearing constitutional challenges to same-sex marriage 
prohibitions in the 1980s and 1990s continued to support the 
definitional approach to marriage by adverting to the procreation 
rationale and by using sexual procreation to distinguish same- and cross-
sex relationships.  For instance, in Adams v. Howerton, a federal district 
court in California looked favorably upon that state’s same-sex marriage 
prohibition in part because “the main justification in this age for societal 
recognition and protection of the institution of marriage is procreation, 
perpetuation of the race.”41 In upholding the lower court’s ruling—
which dealt not with a same-sex marriage prohibition per se but rather 
with whether a same-sex partner constituted a “spouse” under the 
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952—the Ninth Circuit observed 
that because “homosexual marriages never produce offspring,”42 same-
sex marriage prohibitions were permissible under both the federal and 
the state constitutions.  For this reason, two men could not be 
considered “spouses” for federal immigration purposes.43 
Similarly, in Dean v. District of Columbia,44 the Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia relied heavily on sexual 
procreation when it upheld the District’s same-sex marriage prohibition 
against both a due process and an equal protection challenge.  As with 
Baker and its progeny, Dean cited Skinner for the proposition that 
“[m]arriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and 
survival of the race.”45 Moreover, the Dean court remarked that “in 
 
40 Id; see also Hatcher v. Hatcher, 580 S.W.2d 475, 483 (Ark. 1979) (citing the dictionary 
definition of marriage as “a contract between a man (husband) and a woman (wife)” and 
supporting that definition by observing that “[m]arriage is an important institution that is 
fundamental to our very existence and survival”) (citations omitted); Jones v. Hallahan, 501 
S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1973) (same). 
41 486 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (C.D. Cal. 1980); Soos v. Superior Court, 897 P.2d 1356, 1360 
(App. 1994), review denied (1995); Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 73 n.8 (Haw. 1993) (Heen, J., 
dissenting) (same); DeSanto v. Barnsley, 476 A.2d 952, 954 (Pa. Super. 1984) (same).  
42 Adams, 673 F.2d at 1043.   
43 Id. at 1043; see also Constant A., v. Paul C.A., 496 A.2d 1, 18 n.6 (Pa. Super. 1985) 
(remarking that “[i]f the traditional family relationship (lifestyle) was [sic] banned, human 
society would disappear in little more than one generation. . . A primary function of government 
and law is to preserve and perpetuate society . . . .”).   
44 653 A.2d 307 (D.C. 1995).  
45 Id. at 333 (citations omitted).  
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recognizing a fundamental right to marry, the [Supreme] Court has only 
contemplated marriages between persons of opposite sexes—persons 
who had the possibility of having children with each other,”46 as well as 
that “the aspect of marriage that elevates it to a ‘fundamental’ right 
under the due process clause [is] the capacity to have children 
together.”47 
On one level, the Dean court’s procreative reasoning placed it 
directly on the line of cases, starting with Baker, which drew a link 
between marriage and sexual procreation and at the very least suggested 
that the right to marry rested upon the biological possibility to procreate 
sexually.  Under this view, sexual procreation constituted the primary 
axis around which the right to marry revolved and according to which it 
was defined, and was the central feature that distinguished same- and 
cross-sex relationships.  On another level, however, Dean’s justificatory 
rhetoric in other parts of the opinion foreshadows the different sort of 
procreative reasoning that has appeared in the more recent same-sex 
marriage cases.  More specifically, although Dean suggests that the 
possibility of sexual procreation is a necessary (albeit not sufficient) 
attribute of marriage, it also suggests in another part of the opinion that 
the “principal purpose [of marriage is]: to regulate and legitimize the 
procreation of children.”48 Here, the focus is not so much on sexual 
procreation and on the propagation of the species that it ostensibly 
guarantees, but rather on the fact that marriage provides a forum for 
responsible procreation—as the primary or “principal” objective of 
marriage shifts from procreation per se to the legitimization of children 
who are procreated outside a marital context.   
This modified version of the procreation justification that 
appears alongside the old version in Dean has become the predominant 
procreationist rationale in recent same-sex marriage litigation.  To be 
sure, and contrary to Cicchino’s assertion that procreation as 
“propagation of the species” is “no longer taken seriously by courts,”49 
residues of the former procreationist rhetoric continue to appear in some 
of the more recent same-sex marriage cases.50 Increasingly, however, 
 
46 Id.
47 Id. at 335.  
48 Id. at 337 (citing Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 385-86; Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541).   
49 Cicchino, supra note _____, at 151.  
50 See, e.g., Smelt v. City of Orange, 374 F. Supp. 2d 861, 880 (C.D. Cal. 2005), aff’d in part, 
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courts are contemplating a more fully developed version of the so-called 
“private welfare rationale”51 to which the Dean court gave nod—a 
rationale that reflects an anxiety over the extent to which same-sex 
relations/reproduction is similar to, rather than different from, cross-sex 
relations/reproduction.  More specifically, most courts have found that 
procreation constitutes a rational basis for marriage statutes that exclude 
same-sex partners from their definitional ambit because “[m]arriage’s 
vital purpose is not to mandate procreation but to control or ameliorate 
its consequences—the so-called ‘private welfare’ purpose.  To maintain 
otherwise is to ignore procreation’s centrality to marriage.”52 
In a nutshell, the private welfare procreation rationale proceeds 
as follows: The state’s predominant objective in regulating marriage is 
to provide a forum in which responsible child-bearing and child-rearing 
may occur and to ensure that children are legitimized—not, as the 
former same-sex marriage cases suggested, to mandate that procreation 
occur within marriage in the first place.   Furthermore, cross-sex 
reproduction can be—and often is—accidental; same-sex reproduction, 
however, can only ever be the product of choice, planning, and 
forethought.  While the state has an interest in ensuring that cross-sex 
reproduction take place responsibly—and in decreasing the overall 
number of non-marital children—the state has little interest in ensuring 
that same-sex reproduction take place responsibly since same-sex 
couples already assume that responsibility for themselves (and their 
children) by virtue of the very manner in which they reproduce.  It 
therefore follows that because same-sex marriage bears no relation to 
the state’s interest in creating a forum in which either responsible cross-
sex reproduction or the legitimization of non-marital children may 
occur, statutes that limit marriage to cross-sex individuals are 
constitutional under the lowest level of judicial scrutiny.  Interestingly, 
although this newer version of the procreation rationale for same-sex 
marriage prohibitions continues to highlight the differences between 
‘natural’ cross-sex reproduction and ‘artificial’ same-sex reproduction, 
it implicitly (and sometimes explicitly) acknowledges a similarity 
rev’d in part, 447 F.3d 673 (9th Cir. 2006) (stating that “procreation is necessary to perpetuate 
humankind, encouraging the optimal union for procreation is a legitimate government interest”); 
Lewis v. Harris, 875 A.2d 259, 269 (N.J. Super. 2005) (same).  
51 Lewis, 875 A.2d at 276 (Parrillo, J.A.D., concurring).  
52 Id.
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between these two modes of reproduction—namely, the fact that same-
sex couples can reproduce and are reproducing.53 
A more detailed explanation of this so-called ‘private welfare 
rationale’ appears in Morrison v. Sadler,54 where the Indiana Court of 
Appeals upheld that state’s same-sex marriage prohibition exclusively 
on the ground that it advanced the state’s legitimate interest in 
encouraging responsible procreation between cross-sex couples.  Its 
explanation, which is representative of the current version of the 
procreation rationale and which has been cited favorably by several 
courts, is worth quoting in full:  
 
Becoming a parent by using “artificial” 
reproduction methods is frequently costly and time-
consuming.  Adopting children is much the same.  Those 
persons wanting to have children by assisted 
reproduction or adoption are, by necessity, heavily 
invested, financially and emotionally, in those processes. 
 Those processes also require a great deal of foresight 
and planning.  “Natural” procreation, on the other hand, 
may occur only between opposite-sex couples and with 
no foresight or planning.  All that is required is one 
instance of sexual intercourse with a man for a woman 
to become pregnant.   
 What does the difference between “natural” 
reproduction on the one hand and assisted reproduction 
and adoption on the other mean for constitutional 
purposes?  It means that it impacts the State of Indiana’s 
clear interest in seeing that children are raised in stable 
environments.  Those persons who have invested the 
significant time, effort, and expense associated with 
assisted reproduction or adoption may be seen as very 
likely to be able to provide such an environment, with or 
without the “protections” of marriage, because of the 
high level of financial and emotional commitment 
exerted in conceiving or adopting a child or children in 
 
53 See also Dean, 653 A.2d at 336; Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 881 (Vt. 1999).  
54 821 N.E.2d 15, 20 (Ind. App. 2005).  
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the first place. 
By contrast, procreation by “natural” 
reproduction may occur without any thought for the 
future.  The State, first of all, may legitimately create the 
institution of opposite-sex marriage, and all the benefits 
accruing to it, in order to encourage male-female couples 
to procreate within the legitimacy and stability of a state-
sanctioned relationship and to discourage unplanned, 
out-of-wedlock births resulting from “casual” 
intercourse.  Second, even where an opposite-sex couple 
enters into a marriage with no intention of having 
children, “accidents” do happen, or persons often change 
their minds about wanting to have children.  The 
institution of marriage not only encourages opposite-sex 
couples to form a relatively stable environment for the 
“natural” procreation of children in the first place, but it 
also encourages them to stay together and raise a child or 
children together if there is a “change in plans.”55 
In other words, procreation is a rational basis for same-sex marriage 
prohibitions because “recognition of same-sex marriage would not 
promote the State’s interest in marital procreation, particularly 
unintended procreation from heterosexual intercourse.”56 In Part IV, I 
will return to the Morrison court’s framing of same-sex reproduction as 
a ‘better,’ more efficient product than its cross-sex counterpart and will 
there suggest that this image of same-sex procreation ironically conflicts 
with the image of same-sex procreation as counterfeit that has emerged 
from the same-sex marriage debate.  
As with Morrison, the more recent same-sex marriage cases 
reflect a similar shift in the courts’ procreative reasoning, as the 
‘encouraging procreation for the perpetuation of humankind’ argument 
has evolved into the ‘managing procreation as the consequence of 
heterosexual sex’ argument.57 Curiously, and somewhat ironically, 
 
55 Id. at 20-23 (footnotes omitted).   
56 Hernandez v. Robles, 26 A.D.3d 98, 126 (N.Y. 2005), aff’d, Hernandez v. Robles, 2006 WL 
1835429, 2006 N.Y. Slip Op. 05239 (N.Y. Jul 6, 2006).   
57 See, e.g., Wilson v. Ake, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1308 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (“DOMA 
‘encourage[s] the creation of stable relationships that facilitate the rearing of children by both of 
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courts no longer cast same-sex couples seeking marital rights in terms of 
what they lack—namely, the ability to procreate sexually and thereby to 
help perpetuate the human race.  Rather, the current deployment of the 
procreation rationale casts same-sex couples who wish to reproduce in 
terms of what they alone possess—namely, the ability to procreate 
responsibly every time they wish to do so.  Moreover, because same-sex 
reproduction is allegedly better than its cross-sex counterpart, same-sex 
couples and their families neither need nor require the state’s protection 
in the form of marriage.  While courts therefore continue to emphasize 
the difference between same-and cross-sex relationships, artificial 
reproduction has replaced the mere ability to reproduce sexually (and to 
propagate the species) as the key diacritical feature that distinguishes 
those relationships and that renders differential treatment of them 
constitutionally relevant.   
At the same time, however, the fact that courts like Morrison are 
acknowledging that same-sex couples can reproduce and are 
reproducing suggests an implicit recognition of—and discomfort with—
the very thing, procreation, that is starting to bridge the gap between 
same- and cross-sex couples.  Although same-sex couples cannot 
reproduce through sexual means with each other, the fact remains that 
artificial reproductive technology—less common during the early phases 
of same-sex marriage litigation, when the ‘procreation as propagation’ 
rationale was at its height—offers them the opportunity to procreate and 
to generate a ‘product’ that looks very much like the ‘original’ model of 
 
their biological parents’”) (quoting, in part, the federal government’s Memorandum in Support 
of Motion to Dismiss (Dkt.# 39), pp. 15-16)); Hernandez, 26 A.D. 3d at 126 (“recognition of 
same-sex marriage would not promote the State’s interest in marital procreation, particularly 
unintended procreation from heterosexual intercourse, nor would it promote the State’s interest 
in dual-gender parenting”); Shields v. Madigan, 5 Misc. 3d 901 (N.Y. Sup. 2004) (stating that 
“[a]pplying the rational basis test, this court concludes that preserving the institution of 
marriage for opposite sex couples serves the valid public purpose of preserving the historic 
institution of marriage as a union of man and woman, which, in turn, uniquely fosters 
procreation” and that “[t]he institution of marriage is a fundamental right founded on the 
distinction of sex and the potential for procreation”) (emphasis added); Standhardt, 77 P.3d at 
463; Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 1002 (Mass. 2003) (“If society 
proceeds similarly to recognize marriages between same-sex couples who cannot procreate, it . . 
. might result in the mistaken view that civil marriage has little to do with procreation: just as 
the potential of procreation would not be necessary for a marriage to be valid, marriage would 
not be necessary for optimal procreation and child rearing to occur.  In essence, the Legislature 
could conclude that the consequence of such a policy shift would be a diminution in society’s 
ability to steer the acts of procreation and child rearing into their most optimal setting)” (Cordy, 
J., dissenting).  
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cross-sex reproduction.  As one court recently noted, “[t]o be precise, 
same-sex couples can cause procreation.  A female capable of producing 
children can be married to another female and become pregnant through 
various methods, then produce and raise the child in her same-sex 
union.  Similarly, a same-sex male couple could cause a female to 
become pregnant, directly or otherwise, and later adopt and raise the 
child.”58 This explicit recognition of the ability of same-sex couples to 
“cause procreation” signals not only a notable shift from earlier 
procreationist rhetoric that deployed procreation in order to distinguish 
same- and cross-sex relationships, but also a growing awareness of the 
extent to which those relationships are starting to look more, not less, 
like each other.  
In the next Section, I will address some criticisms of the 
procreation rationale both in its past formulation as ‘marriage 
encourages the propagation of the species’ and its current formulation as 
‘marriage encourages responsible cross-sex procreation and the 
legitimization of children.’  These criticisms neglect to explain why that 
rationale, notwithstanding its obvious flaws, is doing most of the work 
to sustain same-sex marriage prohibitions today.  More important, they 
fail to recognize how the recent analogy between counterfeiting and 
same-sex relations provides a clue as to what is behind the courts’ 
procreative logic.   
 
B. Procreation Rationale: Criticisms 
 
Several commentators, and a few courts, have observed that the 
procreation rationale is unconvincing and vulnerable to attack.  Their 
 
58 Coordination Proceeding, Special Title [Rule 1550(c)], Marriage Cases, 2005 WL 583129, at 
*12 n.3 (Mar. 14, 2005) (emphasis added); see also Hernandez v. Robles, 7 Misc. 3d 459, 484 
(N.Y. Sup. 2005), rev’d and vacated by 26 A.D.3d 98, 126 (N.Y. 2005), aff’d, 2006 WL 
1835429, 2006 N.Y. Slip Op. 05239 (N.Y. Jul 6, 2006) (“the reality is that significant numbers 
of couples in New York have formed same-sex families, and numerous couples will continue to 
do so, whether they are allowed to marry or not”); Lewis v. Harris, 875 A.2d at 285 (“the claim 
that the promotion of procreation is a vital element of marriage and justifies exclusion of 
persons of the same gender falls on its face when confronted with reproductive science and 
technology.  The fact is some persons in committed same-sex relationships can and do legally 
and functionally procreate”) (Collester, J.A.D., dissenting); Castle v. State, 2004 WL 1985215, 
at *14 (Wash. Super. Sept. 7, 2004), rev’d, Andersen v. King County, --- P.3d ----, 2006 WL 
2073138 (Wash. Jul 26, 2006) (same); Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 962 n.24 (same); Baker v. 
State, 744 A.2d at 881 (same). 
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criticisms focus on the rationale’s tenuous legal grounding, questionable 
factual grounding, or both, as well as on its inaccurate portrayal of the 
contemporary family.  
First, and with respect to the ‘procreation as propagation’ 
argument, some critics have relied on cases like Skinner v. Oklahoma59 
and Turner v. Safley60 to rebut the contention that the fundamental right 
to marry is conditioned on the ability to procreate.61 Other critics have 
turned to the law governing the grounds for marital annulments and 
divorces in order to refute the notion that procreation is a necessary 
condition of marriage. 62 Relying, in part, on the fraudulent inducement 
to marry line of cases, they have argued that fraud with respect to a 
spouse’s ability or willingness to procreate, rather than a spouse’s innate 
capacity to procreate, is the driving force behind the law’s treatment of 
marital annulments/divorces on the basis of fraud.63 In Coordination 
Proceeding, Special Title [Rule 1550(c)], Marriage Cases, the 
California Superior Court also noted this distinction when it looked 
unfavorably upon that state’s use of the fraudulent inducement to marry 
line of cases in support of the procreation rationale for its same-sex 
marriage prohibition.  As the court remarked, “the cases cited by the 
[State] do not establish that California courts have recognized that the 
purpose of marriage in this state is procreation.  Instead, these cases 
establish that annulment is a remedy for the fraudulent inducement to 
 
59 316 U.S. 535 (1942).  
60 482 U.S. 78 (1987).   
61 See Comment, Divorcing Marriage from Procreation, 114 YALE L.J. 1989, 1994 (2005).  The 
Comment argues that the Skinner Court’s use of the conjunctive “and” in its celebrated 
declaration about the importance of procreation to the “survival of the race” suggests 
“independence, not confluence, between marriage and procreation.”  Id. at 1994.  In addition, 
Skinner was not a fundamental right to marry case, but involved the unequal application of a 
state law that both interfered with procreation as “one of the basic civil rights of man” and 
violated the equal protection guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.  See id. As such, the 
Court’s “discussion of marriage was incidental to its discussion of the importance of 
procreation.” Id. at 1994.  Nowhere in that opinion does the Court even remotely suggest that 
the “basic civil right” to marry is dependent on the “basic civil right” to procreate or that the 
right to marry is only considered to be a fundamental for those who are able to procreate 
sexually with each other.  
62 See, e.g., Note, Sex, Procreation, and the State Interest in Marriage, 102 COLUM. L. REV.
1089, 1092 (2002) (stating that “the State’s interest in the sexual component of marriage has 
traditionally been implicated only by the potential for children to be born outside of it, rather 
than by a need to encourage or guarantee procreation”).   
63 See id.
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marry.”64 Finally, still other critics and courts have responded to the 
‘procreation as propagation’ rationale by simply noting its flagrant over- 
and underinclusiveness,65 its tenuous grounding in logic, and its 
complete lack of empirical, factual support.66 
Second, and with respect to the ‘encouraging responsible 
procreation’ argument, some courts have flatly remarked that “the 
prevention of same-sex marriages is wholly unconnected to promoting 
the rearing of children by married, opposite sex-parents.”67 
Remarkably, even courts that have upheld same-sex marriage 
prohibitions have observed that the ‘encouraging responsible 
procreation’ rationale is troubling because such reasoning would appear 
to militate against marital rights for those individuals who either cannot 
reproduce or do not want to.  Concurring in Morrison, one judge voiced 
his misgivings over the majority’s conclusion that the same-sex 
marriage prohibition at issue in that case was constitutional because it 
rested on the rational basis of “encourag[ing] responsible procreation, 
and same-sex couples cannot procreate through sexual intercourse.”68 
The judge “admit[ted] that I am somewhat troubled by this reasoning.  
Pursuant to this rationale, the State presumably could also prohibit 
sterile individuals or women past their child-bearing years from 
marrying.  In fact, I would assume the State may place any restrictions 
on the right to marry that do not negatively impact the State’s interest in 
 
64 2005 WL 583129, at *8; see also Lewis, 875 A.2d at 285 (“if procreation or the ability to 
procreate is central to marriage, logic dictates that the inability to procreate would constitute 
grounds for its termination.  However, as opposed to the inability or unwillingness to engage in 
sexual intercourse, the inability or refusal to procreate is not a legal basis for divorce or 
annulment”) (Collester, J.A.D., dissenting).   
65 See, e.g., Carpenter, supra note ______, at 205 (stating that the procreation rationale would 
appear to “expose a potential political flaw in the procreation argument: by repeatedly 
emphasizing the importance of procreation in marriage, opponents of gay marriage run the risk 
of demeaning the many married couples for whom procreation is either unwanted or physically 
impossible”); Lewis, 875 A.2d at 289 (Collester, J.A.D., dissenting); Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 
961; Baker, 744 A.2d at 881.   
66 See, e.g., Carpenter; supra note _____, at 194 (“If Western civilization is truly facing a 
population implosion, as some suggest, that is attributable to many factors other than gay 
marriage”); Dean v. Conaway, 2006 WL 148145, at *7 (Md. Cir. Ct. Jan. 20, 2006) (“This 
Court, like others, can find no rational connection between the prevention of same-sex 
marriages and an increase or decrease in the number of heterosexual marriages or of children 
born to those unions”); Lewis, 875 A.2d at 289 (same) (Collester, J.A.D., dissenting).   
67 Dean, 2006 WL 148145, at *7.    
68 Morrison, 821 N.E.2d at 36 (Friedlander, J., concurring in the result). 
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encouraging fertile, opposite-sex couples to marry.”69 
While useful, these criticisms neglect to consider precisely why 
procreationist rhetoric has persisted despite its myriad flaws.  If the 
Supreme Court has suggested that the fundamental right to marry is not 
reserved to those who are able (or who want) to procreate, and if the law 
governing marital annulments is clear that procreation is not a necessary 
condition of marriage, then why have courts given—and, in some 
instances, continue to give—such weight to the ‘procreation as 
propagation’ rationale?  Moreover, if the ‘encouraging responsible 
procreation’ rationale lacks even a remote connection to same-sex 
marriage prohibitions, why has it become the main procreation-centered 
rationale in same-sex marriage litigation today?  Put more simply, what 
is really doing the work to sustain either version of the procreation 
justification?  Understanding the history and theory behind the 
deployment of counterfeiting language to describe non-normative sexual 
and reproductive relationships gets us one step closer to discerning: (1) 
why same-sex marriage provokes such anxiety among marriage 
traditionalists today; (2) why procreation remains their overriding 
concern; and (3) the logic on which both versions of the procreation 
rationale for same-sex marriage prohibitions rest.  At this point, 
however, I briefly offer three reasons why we should be thinking about 
same-sex marriage prohibitions in the larger context of fraud—of which 
counterfeiting is a variety. 
First, it is not an accident that states like California in the 
Marriage Cases are citing to the fraudulent inducement to marry line of 
cases in support of the procreation rationale for same-sex marriage 
prohibitions.70 While a few commentators (and at least one court) have 
remarked that those cases do not stand for the proposition that 
procreation is a necessary condition of marriage,71 some of the 
fraudulent inducement cases and their not-so-distant relatives—those 
cases in which annulments and/or divorces are granted on the basis of 
impotency—do stand for a very important point that the critical 
commentary has overlooked: the idea that marriage without sexual 
procreation is in some sense a sham and a fraud—not a ‘real’ or ‘true’ 
 
69 Id. at 37.  
70 2005 WL 583129, at **6-8.  
71 Id. at *8; see also Note, supra note ______, passim.
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marriage at all. 
For instance, in Santos v. Santos,72 a fraudulent inducement case, 
the Supreme Court of Rhode Island granted a husband-spouse’s petition 
for divorce on the ground that his wife concealed an intention, allegedly 
formed prior to the marriage, not to engage in “normal sexual 
intercourse”73 with him during the marriage and a desire “to engage . . . 
in unnatural intercourse” with him instead.74 Although the court did not 
elaborate specifically on what it meant by “unnatural sexual 
intercourse,” it did suggest that the term was synonymous with non-
procreative sex of the sort engaged in between members of the same 
sex—as the wife left her husband after only three days of marriage “to 
associate with a girl friend of questionable reputation, for whose love 
she professed a preference.”75 In keeping with the law governing 
fraudulent inducements to marry, the court granted the husband’s 
petition on the ground that the wife did not enter into the marriage in 
good faith.76 More interesting, however, is the court’s suggestion that 
what was fraudulent about the wife’s behavior was not only the 
concealment of her true intention at the time the marriage was 
contracted, but also the “unnatural intercourse” in which she allegedly 
sought to engage with her husband; as the court remarked, “the only 
reasonable inference from the uncontradicted and unexplained evidence 
of her own conduct . . . is that from the beginning she had not intended 
to enter into a true marriage.”77 In other words, the marriage was 
fraudulent not only because the wife withheld information from her 
husband at the outset of the marriage, but also because she wanted to 
engage in a certain kind of sex with him—namely, non-procreative 
sexual intercourse—that rendered their marriage less authentic or “true.” 
Similarly, in D. v. C.,78 a New Jersey court granted a wife’s 
petition for annulment on the ground that she suffered from 
“vaginismus, ‘an emotional or mental disorder’” that rendered her 
impotent—even though “she was normal organically and 
 
72 Santos v. Santos, 90 A.2d 771 (R.I. 1952).   
73 Id. at 772.   
74 See also id. at 774.  
75 Id.
76 See id.
77 Id. (emphasis added).   
78 221 A.2d 763 (N.J. Super. Ch. 1966).   
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anatomically.”79 Because the wife was allegedly ignorant of her 
condition prior to marriage, D. v. C. was not a fraudulent inducement 
case per se; rather, what was at issue there was whether the wife, as the 
impotent spouse, could bring the annulment action or whether such 
actions were available to potent spouses only.80 Nevertheless, D. v. C. 
is interesting because it raises the idea, of particular relevance here, that 
marriage without penetrative, procreative sex is a sham or an inauthentic 
marriage—a fraud even in the absence of actual fraudulent conduct.  As 
the court stated in dicta after finding that annulment actions could be 
brought by either the potent or the impotent party: “The public interest 
in dissolving a mock marriage is the same whichever of the parties is 
capable.”81 The fact that the D. v. C. court uses language resonant of 
fraud—“mock marriage”—is particularly noteworthy because the court 
was not dealing with a fraudulent inducement case at all.  Indeed, the 
fact that the wife was acting in good faith with respect to her alleged 
condition did not render her ‘non-procreative’ marriage any more true 
and any less a counterfeit.  
The language that the courts use in these cases to describe non-
procreative, non-penetrative sexual acts (Santos) and the incapacity to 
have procreative sex (D. v. C.), suggests that a marriage that exists 
without procreative intercourse is a sham or “mock” marriage—a fraud 
in and of itself.  It could be, then, that lawmakers are relying on the 
fraudulent inducement to marry line of cases (and on the annulment of 
marriage/divorce cases more generally) in support of same-sex marriage 
prohibitions currently because they are at the very least thinking about 
same-sex relationships as fraudulent in the sense that they are non-
procreative and therefore a travesty of the ‘true’ or authentic thing.  
Second, it makes sense to think about same-sex marriage in 
terms of fraud because certain legal academics have both implicitly and 
explicitly conceptualized the state’s recognition of that relationship as a
kind of fraud.  In Sex and Reason, Judge Richard Posner contended that 
“[p]ermitting homosexual marriage would place government in a 
dishonest position of propagating a false picture of the reality of 
homosexuals’ lives.”82 More recently—and, indeed, more explicitly—
 
79 Id. at 763.   
80 Id.
81 Id. at 765 (emphasis added).   
82 RICHARD POSNER, SEX AND REASON 312 (1992).  
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Professor Lynn Wardle has remarked that “if same-sex unions do not 
contribute to the essential social purposes of marriage, a state that 
confers the legal status of marriage upon same-sex unions commits 
fraud when it presents a false image of same-sex unions as comparable 
to traditional marriage.”83 
Third, the policy rhetoric surrounding the same-sex marriage 
debate makes explicit this connection between same-sex marriage and 
fraud that emerges in the cases and the academic commentary alike.  It 
is to this rhetoric and its implications that I now turn.   
 
II. THE SAME-SEX MARRIAGE DEBATE & THE 
COUNTERFEITING ANALOGY: A SURVEY AND CRITIQUE 
Comparisons between same-sex relations and counterfeiting 
have become so common and so frequent in the rhetoric surrounding the 
same-sex marriage (and same-sex civil unions) debate that they all but 
escape our attention.  This Part looks at those comparisons in order to 
foreground a rhetorical trope whose sheer pervasiveness often causes us 
to forget that it is there in the first place—and, more important, to 
overlook the extent to which that trope just does not hold up.  Section A 
will provide an exhaustive survey of the recent analogies that lawmakers 
and same-sex marriage opponents have made between same-sex 
relations and counterfeiting—analogies that have, in fact, started to find 
their way into court decisions.  Section B will then demonstrate the 
ways in which the counterfeiting trope is descriptively inaccurate as 
applied to both civil unions and same-sex marriage—thus forcing one to 
ask just why that trope has persisted notwithstanding its imprecision.   
A. Counterfeiting Rhetoric in Law and Policy Today 
 
Opponents of rights and benefits for same-sex couples in the 
form of civil unions84 and domestic partnership recognition85 routinely 
 
83 Lynn Wardle, “Multiply and Replenish”: Considering Same-Sex Marriage in Light of State 
Interests in Marital Procreation, 24 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 771, 775 (2001) (emphasis 
added). 
84 Civil unions are state-sanctioned relationships between two same-sex individuals.  
Connecticut and Vermont are the only two jurisdictions in the United States that recognize civil 
unions between same-sex partners.  See Connecticut Substitute Senate Bill 963 (2005); VT.
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conceptualize such ‘marriage approximations’ or ‘marriage equivalents’ 
in the language of counterfeit.  For instance, just one month after the 
terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, Robert Knight accused 
“homosexual activists”—that is, the gay and lesbian partners of victims 
of the 9/11 attacks who sought benefits from the September 11 Victim 
Compensation Fund and the American Red Cross—of “trying to hijack 
the moral capital of marriage and apply it to their own relationships,” 
which he characterized as “counterfeit marriage.”86 In just a single 
stroke, Knight managed to conflate genuine terrorism, “homosexual” 
activism, same-sex relationships, and counterfeiting in a way that 
situated those four varieties of ‘assault’ on the same symbolic plane and 
that no doubt resonated with a public intensely fearful of each.87 
Like Knight, Janet La Rue, Chief Counsel for Concerned 
Women  for America (CWA), has deployed similar—albeit less 
incendiary—counterfeiting rhetoric to describe the legal regime that 
would have existed under the version of the Federal Marriage 
Amendment (FMA) that was first introduced in Congress in 2002.  The 
original version of the FMA, which failed to pass in the Senate in 2003, 
defined marriage as a “union between a man and a woman,” and stated, 
in part, that “[n]either this Constitution or the constitution of any state, 
 
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §1201(4) (2003).   
85 A domestic partnership is a legal relationship recognized by the state and/or jurisdiction in 
which it is entered; unlike civil unions, domestic partnership recognition does not guarantee the 
same rights and benefits that the state confers upon cross-sex married couples.  California, 
Hawaii, Maine, New Jersey, and the District of Columbia are the only jurisdictions in the United 
States that recognize domestic partnerships (but not civil unions) between two same-sex 
individuals.     
86 J. Johnson, Homosexuals Seek Survivor Benefits Intended For Families, at 
http:///www.dadi.org/homogred.htm. (Oct. 1, 2001) (remarks of Robert Knight); see also James 
Dobson, Dr. Dobson’s Newsletter, at 
http://www.family.org/docstudy/newsletters/a0019238.html. (Feb. 9, 2004) (charging New York 
State Governor, George Pataki, for “dilut[ing] the definition of ‘family’ by giving gay partners 
the same access to terrorist relief benefits that married couples have”).    
87 Knight’s casting of gays and lesbians as the ‘terrorists’ in our midst whose aim it is to devise 
new and better ways to bring down the “institution” of marriage, set the stage for later 
comparisons between terrorism and the “gay rights” movement.  For instance, Lou Sheldon, 
founder and Chairman of the Traditional Values Coalition, evoked similar imagery when he 
responded to the Supreme Court’s decision in Lawrence v. Texas by drawing on the ‘9/11’ 
trope: “This is a major wake-up call.  This is a 9/11, major wake-up call that the enemy is at our 
doorsteps.  This decision will open a floodgate.  This will redirect the stream of what is morally 
right and what is morally wrong into a deviant kind of behavior.”  R. Bluey, Homosexuals Push 
For Same-Sex Marriage After Sodomy Ruling, Christian News Service, at 
http://www.cnsnews.com/Culture/Archive/200306/CUL20030627a.html (June 27, 2003).   
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nor state or federal law, shall be construed to require that marital status 
or the legal incidents thereof be conferred upon unmarried couples or 
groups.”88 The 2006 version of the FMA, which failed to pass in the 
Senate in June 2006, altered some of the language of the 2002 version to 
read, in part, that “[n]either this Constitution, nor the constitution of any 
State, shall be construed to require that marriage or the legal incidents 
thereof be conferred upon any union other than the union of a man and a 
woman.”89 Whereas the 2006 version, unlike its predecessor, targets the 
“unions” of same-sex couples exclusively, both versions leave open the 
possibility that state legislatures will confer the “legal incidents” of 
marriage upon unmarried same-sex couples—even if they are not 
required to do so under either the federal Constitution or their respective 
state constitutions. While the drafters and proponents of the FMA 
contended that “[t]he traditional autonomy of state legislatures on family 
law matters is preserved by the text of the Amendment,”90 La Rue 
decried the counterfeit scheme that its permissive language failed to 
capture:    
 
America has federal laws to protect our currency 
because we recognize that counterfeit currency is a 
serious threat to our national economy.  We must have 
laws to preserve and protect marriage because 
counterfeit marriage is a serious threat to the stability of 
society and the health and welfare of children.  CWA 
opposes the Federal Marriage Amendment (FMA) [of 
2002] because it would not prevent state legislatures 
from recognizing and benefiting civil unions and other 
 
88 The full version of the original FMA read: “Marriage in the United States shall consist only of 
the union of a man and a woman.  Neither this Constitution or the constitution of any state, nor 
state or federal law, shall be construed to require that marital status or the legal incidents thereof 
be conferred upon unmarried couples or groups.”  The original FMA was drafted by the 
Alliance for Marriage (AFM).   
89 H.J. RES. 106 (108th Congress 2004) and S.J. RES. 40 (108th Congress 2004).  The 2006 
version of the FMA—which was itself based on an earlier version that failed to pass in Congress 
in 2004—therefore allows courts to confer the legal incidents of marriage upon unmarried 
cross-sex couples, something which the 2002 version did not permit.   
90 Janet La Rue, Why Concerned Women for America Opposes the Federal Marriage 
Amendment, at,
http://www.cwfa.org/articledisplay.asp?id=4452&department=LEGAL&categoryid=family 
(Aug. 18, 2003)  (statements of Matt Daniels, Founder and President, Alliance for Marriage).   
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such relationships, which would result in legalized 
counterfeit marriage.91 
La Rue further remarked that “[t]he FMA does not prevent legislative 
acts that would create civil unions that are counterfeit marriages.  
Although legally distinct from marriage, it is a distinction without a 
difference in all other respects.”92 For this reason, “CWA believes that 
an amendment to preserve marriage should do more than preserve it in 
name only.”93 
Knight and La Rue’s comparison of civil unions to counterfeit 
currency has become a routine way of characterizing any legal regime 
that recognizes either, or both, civil unions and the extension of 
marriage-like rights to same-sex couples.  Thus, when the St. Thomas 
More Law Center sued the Ann Arbor, Michigan public school district 
in 2003 for using taxpayers’ dollars to extend insurance benefits to 
same-sex partners, Richard Thompson, the Center’s chief counsel, 
stated that “[t]he purpose of this lawsuit is to stop these counterfeit 
marriages.”94 Similarly, supporters of Utah’s Amendment 3, which both 
defines marriage exclusively in cross-sex terms and provides that “[n]o 
other domestic union, however denominated, may be recognized as a 
marriage or given the same or substantially equivalent legal effect,” 
stated that the amendment would, among other things, “[p]revent the 
creation of ‘counterfeit marriages,’ such as civil unions.”95 Supporters 
of similar amendments and laws in other states, like Arkansas, 
Pennsylvania and Ohio, have remarked that an expansive marriage 
protection amendment is necessary in order to prevent “counterfeit 
marriage that devalue[s] traditional marriage in the same way 
counterfeit money devalues real money,”96 “to prevent same-sex 
 
91 Janet La Rue, CWA Opposes the Federal Marriage Amendment, at 
http://www.massnews.com/2003_Editions/8_august/082003_mn_cwa_against_homosexual_mar
riages.html) (Aug. 1, 2003). 
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Maryanne George, Schools Sued Over Same-Sex Benefits: Ann Arbor is Test Case for More 
Law Center, at http://www.freep.com/news/mich/part23_20030923.htm (Sept. 23, 2003). 
95 Monte Stewart, Utah Marriage Amendment Deserves Support, Institute for Marriage and 
Public Policy, at http://www.marriagedebate.com/2004/09/utah-marriage-amendment-
deserves.htm (Sept. 7, 2004).   
96 Arkansas Marriage Amendment Committee: A Campaign to Protect Marriage in Arkansas,  at 
http://www.arkansasmarriage.com/static/about/faq.php (last visited Aug. 14, 2006).  
29
marriage [and] its counterfeit—civil unions,”97 and to “identif[y] 
marriage as having a unique place in our society and protect[ ] it from 
any counterfeits,”98 respectively.   
Some opponents of civil unions and similar de facto marriage 
‘equivalents’ push the counterfeiting metaphor even further to suggest a 
parallel relationship between the injurious effects of counterfeit 
currency on the actual capital of the economy and the injurious effects 
of de facto marriage on the symbolic capital of marriage itself.  As one
representative in Virginia’s House of Delegates opined: “Counterfeit 
money hurts our wallets.  Counterfeit marriage will do the same to real 
marriage.  Homosexuals need no special institution parallel to marriage, 
such as civil unions, to enjoy the same rights under law to vote, buy a 
house, go to public colleges, start businesses, and exercise rights and 
opportunities now available to all Virginians.”99 Or, as Tony Perkins, 
President of the Family Research Council, recently remarked: “We do 
not support the civil union and domestic partnership laws because we 
see them as counterfeit institutions.  Just as counterfeit $20 bills impact 
our economy, we feel these counterfeit unions have an impact on our 
culture.”100 For these and other marriage traditionalists who flatly 
oppose the extension of legal and economic benefits to same-sex 
couples, “[c]ivil unions are nothing but a counterfeit form of marriage.  
Just as counterfeiting currency has the potential to bankrupt an 
economy, redefining the social foundation of civilization by 
transforming homosexual behavior into a public norm has the potential 
to wreak havoc on social life as Americans know it.”101 It is worth 
 
97 Marriage Protection Amendment (MPA) Voted Out of Committee – But What Happened the 
Next Day??, American Family Association of Pennsylvania, at 
http://www.afaofpa.org/action_alert_archives_2006.htm (Mar. 27, 2006).  
98 State v. Knipp, 2005 WL 1017620, at *4 (Ohio Mun. Mar. 10, 2005) (quoting The Ohio 
Campaign to Protect Marriage website, at www.ohiomarriage.com/legal_issues_&_news.shtml).  
99 No ‘New Jim Crow’ in Virginia, WASH. POST. at A25 (July 3, 2004), available at 
www.washingtonpoast.com/wp-dyn/articles/A24784-2004Jul2.html (letter to the editor by 
Virginia State Representative, Robert G. Marshall (R), in support of Virginia’s Marriage 
Affirmation Act); see also Ruth Padawer, Seeking Society’s Embrace: Gay Couples Sue New 
Jersey For Right To Marry, at http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgi-
bin/iowa/news/news.html?record=1096 (July 21, 2002) (quoting head of the New Jersey Family 
Policy Council, Len Deo’s, remarks that “‘[a]ny attempt to counterfeit marriage as anything 
different than one man and one woman degrades the real thing . . .”).   
100 Timothy Dailey, The Slippery Slope of Same-Sex Marriage, Family Research Council, at 
http:// www.frc.org/get.cfm?i=BC04C02 (Sept. 2005).  
101 The Battle Over Same-Sex Marriage, PBS Online Newshour, at 
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noting that similar counterfeiting analogies also surfaced in the debate 
surrounding the extension of ‘marriage-like’ benefits to same-sex 
couples in England during the passage of the Relationships (Civil 
Registration) Bill, which became law in that country on November 18, 
2004.  Simon Calvert, Deputy Director of The Christian Institute in 
England, remarked that the effect of the Bill would be to “devalue[e] the 
currency of marriage in the law.  It’s Monopoly money—not the real 
thing.”102 
Just as civil unions, domestic partnerships, and benefits for 
same-sex couples more generally have been compared to a counterfeit 
form of marriage, so, too, has same-sex marriage itself been compared 
to a counterfeit form of the cross-sex archetype.  Robert Knight relied 
on the counterfeiting trope as early as 1995, when he stated that 
“[s]ame-sex couples do not qualify [for marriage].  It might be called a 
partnership, but if it’s called marriage, it’s a counterfeit version.  And 
counterfeit versions drive out the real thing.”103 More recently, and as 
mentioned in this Article’s Introduction, Marilyn Musgrave deployed 
the analogy in support of the Federal Marriage Amendment in 2003.104 
Since that time, a significant number of same-sex marriage opponents 
have made such remarks as same-sex marriage is “a counterfeit, which 
cheapens the real thing”105 and “[s]ame sex [sic] marriage devalues 
traditional marriage the same way counterfeit money devalues real 
currency.”106 In their view, “it is a falsehood to call it a marriage.  
Those who are claiming social or legal recognition of their relationship 
as if it were a true marriage are thus asking society and the law to affirm 
a falsehood.”107 Indeed, testifying before the Maryland House Judiciary 
Committee in January 2006 in support of that state’s proposed marriage 
 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/law/gay_marriage/q2.html (remarks of Peter Sprigg, Director 
of the Family Research Council’s Marriage and Family Studies) (last visited Aug. 14, 2006).   
102 The Christian Institute, News Release, Gay Partnerships Bill Creates Counterfeit  Marriage,
at http://www.christian.org.uk/pressreleases/2001/october_24_2001.htm (Oct. 24, 2001).  
103 David W. Dunlap, Some States Trying To Stop Gay Marriages Before They Start, N.Y. 
TIMES, 1995 WL 3812247 (Mar. 15, 1995) (Remarks of Robert Knight).   
104 Cheryl Wetzstein, Bill To Define Marriage Tried Again in House as Two States Mull Cases,
WASH. TIMES (May 26, 2003).   
105 Sandy Rios and Martin Ornelas-Quintero, Same-Sex Marriage? Hispanic Magazine.com, at 
http://www.hispaniconline.com/magazine/2004/march/Forum/index.html (Mar. 2004). 
106 Jan Dean, Gay Marriage Attacks Family Unit: Protestor, MISSISSAUGA NEWS (Mar. 4, 2005). 
107 Kenneth D. Whitehead, Why Same-Sex “Marriage” Is a Bad Idea, at 
http://www.cwnews.com/news/viewstory.cfm?recnum=32617 (June 1, 2006).   
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amendment, Knight remarked that “creating counterfeits [like same-sex 
marriage] undermines support in the law and culture for the real 
thing.”108 Or, as made clear in a public statement issued by the St. 
Thomas More Law Center immediately after the successful passage of a 
constitutional marriage amendment in Michigan on Election Day, 2004: 
“The amendment is intended to prohibit courts or other efforts to impose 
same-sex marriage, polygamy, or any other form of counterfeit 
‘marriage’ on the state.”109 Similar counterfeiting rhetoric has also 
surfaced in the controversy over same-sex marriage in Spain, which 
legalized that relationship in 2005.  Following the Spanish cabinet’s 
approval of a proposal allowing same-sex couples both to marry and to 
adopt children—a proposal signed into law on July 2, 2005—Juan 
Antonio Martinez Camp, a spokesperson for the Spanish Bishops’ 
Conference, stated on national television that “permitting same-sex 
marriage would be like ‘imposing a virus on society’” and that “the 
decision would be tantamount to introducing ‘a counterfeit currency’” in 
Spain.110 
Opponents of same-sex marriage have deployed counterfeiting 
rhetoric to convey not only their concern that same-sex marriage 
cheapens and devalues its cross-sex counterpart, but also their belief that 
same-sex partnerships are intrinsically non-procreative.  As Janet LaRue 
remarked: 
 
Granting same-sex couples a license to marry will not 
create true marriage. Neither two men nor two women 
can become one flesh. Licensing the unnatural does not 
make it natural. It would be a state-sanctioned 
counterfeit, a sham and a fraud. A licensed electrician 
cannot produce power by taping two same-sex plugs 
together. Homosexual sex is dangerous and destructive 
to the human body and powerless for human 
 
108 Testimony for the Maryland House Judiciary Committee, Robert Knight, concerning H.B. 
48, the Maryland Marriage Amendment (Jan. 31, 2006).   
109 Michigan Voters Join Nationwide Mandate in Support of Traditional Marriage; Law Center 
Prepared to Defend Bans if Challenged, Statement by the Thomas More Law Center, at 
http://www.thomasmore.org/news.html?NewsID=247 (Nov. 3, 2004).  
110 Marlise Simons, Spain’s Secular Agenda Infuriates the Clergy, INT’L HERALD TRIBUNE, 2004 
WL 5285873 (Oct. 5, 2004).   
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reproduction.111 
This idea that two (or too) similar entities—two same-sex electrical 
plugs, two men, two women—cannot mix in a positively reproductive 
way, resonates with a similar analogy that was recently made by Glen 
Lavy, Senior Counsel of the Alliance Defense Fund (ADF) and Senior 
Vice President of ADF’s Marriage Litigation Center, in reference to a 
lawsuit brought in Israel challenging that country’s same-sex marriage 
prohibition. Commenting on one of the reasons why same-sex marriage 
warrants prohibition, Lavy said: “It takes sodium and chloride to make 
salt.  If you add sodium to sodium, you don’t have salt.  If you add 
chloride to chloride, you don’t have salt . . . . It takes a man and a 
woman to make babies.”112 
The remarks of other commentators similarly evoke a connection 
between counterfeit and ‘sterile’ sex.  As one critic of same-sex 
marriage commented:  
 
A same-sex marriage is no marriage at all.  It is a 
counterfeit, a fraud.  Governments have encouraged true 
marriages because they stabilize society and benefit 
governments in a dozen different ways.  Same-sex 
marriages are counterfeit, immoral, totally sterile, 
lacking the No. 1 reason for marriage—procreation—
ignoring the wisdom of ages and common sense.113 
The Catholic Civil Rights League of Ottowa, Canada, made this 
connection between non-procreative sex and counterfeit even more 
explicit: 
 
Excluding same-sex couples from marriage is not related 
to their homosexual orientation, or to them as 
individuals. Rather, the exclusion of their relationship is 
 
111 Janet La Rue, Talking Points: Why Homosexual “Marriage” Is Wrong, Sept. 16, 2003, at 
www.cwfa.org/articledisplay.asp?id=4589&department=LEGAL& categoryid=family. 
112 Michael Foust, Israel, Too? Supreme Court in Holy Land To Hear ‘Gay Marriage’ Case In 
Late May, BP News, at http://www.bpnews.net/bpnews.asp?ID=22990 (Apr. 6, 2006).  
113 DAILY HERALD (Arlington Heights, IL), Letters to the Editor, 2004 WL 5637560 (Apr. 25, 
2004).   
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related to the fact that it is not inherently procreative, 
and, therefore, if it is included within marriage, marriage 
cannot institutionalize and symbolize respect for the 
transmission of life. To recognize same-sex relationships 
as marriage would unavoidably change and eliminate 
this function of marriage. Same-sex “marriage” devalues 
the real thing in the same way that any counterfeit 
devalues the authentic.114 
It bears noting that similar statements have found their way into the 
Congressional Record.  Testifying before Congress on behalf of DOMA 
in 1996, Gary Bauer, former President of the Family Research Council, 
remarked that, were the state to recognize a marriage between same-sex 
partners, “the fiction [of same-sex marriage would be] imposed on 
everyone and the counterfeit [would] do great harm to the special status 
that the institution has earned . . . [M]arriage is a unique bonding of the 
two sexes, with the probable expectation of procreation of children . . . . 
[C]reating a counterfeit would be a slap in the face to millions of 
Americans.”115 Indeed, all of these statements call to mind the D. v. C. 
court’s remarks that even a cross-sex marriage without procreative sex 
is a “mock marriage”—a “sham” and a “fraud”—as well as the Santos 
court’s suggestion that a marriage without “normal sexual intercourse” 
is not a “true marriage” at all.   
 
B. Undoing the Counterfeiting Analogy  
 
The counterfeiting trope that same-sex marriage opponents have 
deployed to illustrate the threat that both civil unions and same-sex 
marriage represent defies logic for the following reason: neither civil 
unions nor same-sex marriage as their opponents conceptualize them 
resembles what we typically think about when we think about 
counterfeits.  
For instance, La Rue notes that the only difference between 
 
114 Engage in the Marriage Debate, Catholic Civil Rights League, at 
http://www.ccrl.ca/index.php?id=122 (last visited Aug. 15, 2006).  
115 U.S. CONG. TEST., 1996 WL 387291 (F.D.C.H.) (July 11, 1996) (testimony of Gary L. 
Bauer). 
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marriage and civil unions represents a “distinction without a difference” 
and that the original FMA as drafted preserved marriage “in name 
only”—thus suggesting that civil unions and marriage are substantively 
the same as, or at least similar to, each other.  La Rue’s 
conceptualization of civil unions as counterfeit, however, is 
descriptively inaccurate because her vision of counterfeit does not 
reflect what a ‘true’ counterfeit is.  That is, we typically think about a 
counterfeit as a product that is identical in form to, although different in 
substance (or intrinsic worth) from, the original that it is attempting to 
copy.116 Indeed, the critical difference between a Louis Vuitton original 
and a Louis Vuitton counterfeit is the fact that the latter differs in 
substance from the former even though the two assume the same name 
or form—to wit, a Louis Vuitton.  La Rue, however, appears to be 
suggesting quite the opposite: while civil unions are nominally or 
formally distinguishable from marriage (i.e., they are in name something 
else), they are substantively similar to that institution (i.e., they 
guarantee similar rights and benefits, thus differing “in name only”). 
Under this formulation, civil unions are not a counterfeit at all because 
they alert the public that they are not, in fact, a Louis Vuitton marriage 
original.   
Similarly, Knight’s deployment of the counterfeiting trope to 
describe both same-sex marriage and civil unions does not hold up 
because neither of those relationships is a true counterfeit. To recall, in 
1995, Knight remarked that while same-sex couples might form a 
partnership, they cannot form a genuine marriage: “if it’s called 
marriage, it’s a counterfeit version.  And counterfeit versions drive out 
the real thing.”117 More recently, and with respect to the extension of 
non-marital rights to same-sex partners, Knight has suggested that the 
FMA “allows for legislatures to enact the rest of the homosexual agenda 
right up to civil unions and other forms of counterfeit marriage.  As 
written, the amendment will give politicians cover while they promote 
homosexuality by other means. . . . Marriage is too important to be 
 
116 For instance, under the Lanham (Trademark) Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1116, a counterfeit is 
defined as “a spurious designation that is identical with, or substantially indistinguishable from, 
a designation as to which the remedies of this chapter are made available by reason of section 
220506 of Title 36.” 15 U.S.C.A. § 1116 (2002).   
117 Dunlap, supra note ______ (remarks of Robert Knight).   
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defended in name only.”118 
A fundamental incongruity marks Knight’s (and La Rue’s) 
deployment of counterfeiting rhetoric to describe civil unions and same-
sex marriage.  As with La Rue, in Knight’s estimation, the problem with 
civil unions is that they are substantively similar to marriage but are 
called something else—the only difference between them being a 
nominal one that acts as a “cover” for what ‘really’ lies beneath.  
Furthermore, the problem with same-sex marriage is that it both shares 
all the attributes of marriage and is called the same thing: “if [a same-
sex ‘partnership’] is called something else [other than just a
‘partnership’], it’s counterfeit marriage.”  In other words, if the problem 
with civil unions is that they are nominally distinct from marriage but 
possess many of the substantive attributes thereof, the problem with 
same-sex marriage is that it both possesses all of the substantive 
attributes of marriage and is called the same thing.  What Knight fails to 
recognize, however, is that, under this formulation, neither civil unions 
nor same-sex marriage represents a true counterfeit—a product that 
looks formally identical to (i.e., has the same name as), but is 
substantively different from (i.e., has different attributes than), the 
original that it is attempting to copy.  In either instance, the 
counterfeiting trope as it has been deployed fails accurately to depict 
what is fraudulent about civil unions and marriage, respectively.  
Indeed, to accuse same-sex couples of perpetrating a fraud is curious in 
light of the fact that their relationships are so often characterized as a 
form of flaunting that is best relegated to the closet.  Unlike a 
counterfeit, and as mentioned in the Introduction, same-sex marriage is, 
for many, akin to the obscene: “I know it when I see it.”119 
Given its descriptive imprecision, one wonders why the 
counterfeiting trope has had such resonance in the same-sex marriage 
debate.  Put another way, what exactly is driving counterfeiting rhetoric 
notwithstanding the fact that, when analyzed closely, neither same-sex 
marriage nor civil unions is a ‘true’ or ‘real’ counterfeit?  I submit that 
the answer to both this question and that posed in the previous Part—
why the procreation rationale for same-sex marriage prohibitions has 
 
118 Robert Knight, No Room For Compromise: Lending Legitimacy To Any Sex Outside 
Marriage Is Not a Reasonable Position, NATIONAL REVIEW ONLINE, at 
http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/comment-knight080901.shtml (Aug. 9, 2001).  
119 Jacobellis v. State of Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).   
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persisted in the law despite its flaws—lies somewhere at the intersection 
of counterfeiting and procreation.  My claim here, which I will more 
fully develop in the next two Parts, is the following: just as the 
counterfeiting trope makes more sense when viewed in light of the 
unnatural and deceptive non-procreative acts that it signifies, the 
procreation rationale for same-sex marriage prohibitions makes more 
sense when viewed as a kind of counterfeit or fraud perpetrated upon the 
public.  While procreation alone might not constitute even a rational 
basis for same-sex marriage prohibitions, the prevention of fraud surely 
does.  For this reason, it is necessary to understand the relationship 
between counterfeiting and procreation in order to see how each is 
shoring up the other in the same-sex marriage debate.   
 
III. SODOMY, MISCEGENATION, AND THE COUNTERFEITING 
ANALOGY: HISTORY AND THEORY 
Analogies between non-normative sexual practices and 
subversive forms of commercial exchange have a history and a tradition 
both in the law and outside of it.  Understanding that history is 
necessary for two reasons.  First, it clarifies the procreation rationale for 
same-sex marriage prohibitions and the role that procreation is playing 
in the same-sex marriage debate today.  Second, it explains how same-
sex marriage can properly be characterized as a variety of fraud in the 
first place.  The purpose of this Part is therefore to survey the history 
and theory behind the counterfeiting analogy in different contexts in 
order to provide a structure for Part IV, where I will discuss the work 
that the procreation rationale, and counterfeiting rhetoric, is doing in the 
contemporary same-sex marriage debate.  In this sense, understanding 
the history behind the counterfeiting analogy is indispensable to seeing 
the extent to which history is repeating itself.   For instance, and as I will 
show, the portrayal of counterfeiters that appears in these sources re-
emerges, triumphantly, in Justice Scalia’s Romer v. Evans dissent and in 
the legal debate over same-sex marriage—the latter of which is merely a 
continuation of the former.  Finally, in this Part I look to extra-legal 
sources—e.g., Dante’s treatment of the counterfeiters in the Inferno—in 
order to provide a “thicker” interpretation of the law’s current portrayal 
of gays and lesbians in the marriage context.  As such, this Part at least 
theoretically relies on Professor Kenji Yoshino’s larger project in 
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Suspect Symbols, namely, the turning to literature, and literary 
“symbols,” in order provide a “‘thicker’ response” to the procreation 
rationale than “conventional” legal responses to that rationale have 
afforded.120 
Section A examines selected texts from the early-modern period 
that describe sodomy and counterfeiting in analogous terms.  Part IV 
will use this history to argue that the procreation rationale reflects a 
similar anxiety over sodomy as a fraudulent form of sexual exchange.  
Section B examines the nineteenth-century deployment of counterfeiting 
rhetoric to describe the ‘counterfeit’ product of that era’s signature non-
normative sexual relationship, miscegenation.  Part IV will use the 
miscegenation parallel to argue that the procreation rationale reflects a 
similar anxiety over same-sex procreation as a counterfeit form of 
exchange that allows the families of same-sex couples to “pass” for the 
real thing.   
 
A.  Sodomy and Counterfeiting  
 
In November 2001, “homosexual activists” were accused of 
“waging a war” against the Salvation Army (“Army”) when they 
launched the “Queer Dollars Campaign” against that charitable 
organization in Cleveland, Ohio.121 As a form of public protest against 
the Army’s discriminatory employment policies toward sexual 
orientation minorities in the areas of hiring and domestic-partner 
benefits, LGBT activists from the Anti-Racist Action of Cleveland 
deposited phony three-dollar bills into the Army’s kettles during its 
annual drive—“queer” bills that contained the following slogan: “When 
the Salvation Army ends its policy of religious bigotry against gay, 
lesbian, bisexual and transgender people, then and only then will this be 
a real dollar bill.”122 One website reported the incident with the 
following headline: “Homosexuals Attack Salvation Army with 
 
120 Yoshino, supra note _______, at 1756.  
121 Martha Kleder, Homosexual Activists Target Salvation Army Kettles, Concerned Women For 
America, Culture and Family Institute, at 
http://www.cwfa.org/articles/322/CFI/cfreport/index.htm (Nov. 28, 2001).   
122 Id.
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Counterfeit Currency.”123 
The symbolic protest undertaken by Cleveland’s Anti-Racist 
Action was no doubt inspired by the slang phrase “queer as a three 
dollar bill,” one whose origins may be traced back to the early-modern 
association between “queer as homosexual activity” and “queer as 
counterfeit money.”  According to the Oxford Dictionary of Modern 
Slang, two seemingly distinct—although, as I will show here, 
conceptually related—definitions exist for the word “queer,” 
specifically, “homosexual” and “counterfeit money.”124 The Dictionary 
explains that the latter use of ‘queer-as-counterfeit’ derives from at least 
the seventeenth century, when “counterfeiters” and “receivers of false 
coins” were labeled “queere-cole-maker[s]” and “queer-cole-fencer[s],” 
respectively.125 The Dictionary is silent, however, as to the etiology of 
the former use of “queer as homosexual”—other than noting that this 
particular slang version of “queer” exists.  According to the more 
comprehensive Oxford English Dictionary, however, the poet and 
writer, W. H. Auden, was the first person to use “queer” in the sense of 
“homosexual” in 1932.126 While both Oxford dictionaries therefore 
observe the two-fold use of the word “queer” to denote counterfeiting 
and homosexuality, neither appears to recognize its dual use as 
signifying anything but a linguistic coincidence.  That is, neither 
dictionary accounts for a more comprehensive connection (or 
interrelationship) between the subversive economic practice of 
counterfeiting and homosexuality—or, perhaps more accurately, the 
“utterly confused category”127 of sodomy that the latter has come to 
represent.   
Scholars of language and early-modern literature, however, have 
suggested otherwise.  They maintain that the use of “queer” to describe 
both subversive economics and subversive sexuality is not adventitious. 
Rather, “[q]ueer as homosexual appears to grow out of [ ] antecedent 
coining terminology”; moreover, “[t]he modern usage might be traced to 
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early sexological formulations in which homosexuality was seen as an 
illegitimate, or counterfeit, imitation of heterosexuality.”128 In his 
examination of the “historical overlapping of these seemingly distinct 
queer discourses”129 during the early-modern period, Will Fisher 
cogently demonstrates that “sodomy and counterfeiting were . . . united 
conceptually long before the linguistic connection was established.”130 
In Fisher’s view, a “particular cultural logic  
. . . structures the connection between sodomy”131 and the economic 
transgression of counterfeiting—the same logic that gave rise to the dual 
use of “queer” in the first place.  As another scholar of the early-modern 
period has noted: “[t]he common denominator [between queer as 
homosexual and queer as counterfeit] is difference, unnaturalness, 
fraudulence; but within that thwarting of the straight, the signifier 
‘queer’ shuttles between spheres of the material—money and 
geometry—to more inchoate spheres of ethics and identity.”132 
In order to understand the current formulation of same-sex 
relations as counterfeit, then, it is necessary to understand the cultural 
origins of the early-modern association between sodomy/homosexuality 
and counterfeiting.  At first blush, and using the analogy of “queer as a 
three dollar bill” as our starting point, it would appear that the 
association between ‘queer as homosexual’ and ‘queer as counterfeit’ is 
descriptively inaccurate if it is intended merely to suggest that sexual 
orientation minorities are deceptive in the same way that counterfeit 
bills are deceptive.  While this idea that sexual orientation minorities—
to whom the language of “passing” is applied no less than it is to 
counterfeit currency—is no doubt behind the analogy between “queers” 
and counterfeit, something else is doing the work to shore up the 
“cultural logic” that unites counterfeiting and homosexuality.  The slang 
idiom “queer as a three dollar bill” cannot simply intend to cast the 
“homosexual” as fraudulent in the sense of being deceptive because a 
“queer three dollar bill” presents or announces itself as a fake by virtue 
of the fact that it is, after all, a three dollar bill.133 For this reason, to 
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accuse ‘homosexuals of attacking the Salvation Army with counterfeit 
currency,’ as one website did, when LGBT activists deposited three-
dollar bills into the Salvation Army’s kettles is a curious—albeit 
common—slip.  
It is worth thinking about the conceptual relationship between 
‘queer as homosexual’ and ‘queer as counterfeit’ not just in terms of 
deceptive imitation—even though deceptive imitation is, as the next 
Part shows, very much a concern for same-sex marriage opponents who 
routinely talk about same-sex relations in the language of fraud.  Rather, 
we should think about this conceptual relationship in terms of the 
intrinsically non-procreative sexual relations in which “queers” are 
presumed to engage.  This notion that sexual orientation minorities are 
“queer as a three dollar bill” because they engage in non-procreative sex 
not only links up with the ‘procreation as propagation’ rationale for 
same-sex marriage prohibitions—insofar as that rationale rests on the 
inability of a same-sex couple to cause sexual procreation—but also 
explains at least part of what is driving the current analogy between 
same-sex relations and counterfeiting.  It also explains, as Part IV will 
show, both the casting of ‘homosexuals’ in the contemporary same-sex 
marriage debate and what is really behind the procreation rationale for 
same-sex marriage prohibitions. 
During the early-modern period, counterfeiting and sodomy 
together figured as unnatural (and therefore “queer”) forms of non-
procreative exchange.  Fisher has noted that a number of early-modern 
texts conceptualize sodomy and counterfeiting in parallel terms.  He 
remarks that “[s]ometimes, the language of counterfeiting is used to 
describe a sodomitical relationship . . . ; sometimes, the sodomite is 
actually accused of making false coins . . . . In [these texts], sodomy and 
counterfeiting are coterminous.”134 For instance, in Elizabeth Cary’s 
The History of the Life, Reign, and Death of Edward II,135 written in 
1680, the author describes the English King’s renowned “sodomitical” 
tendencies in subversive numismatic terms.136 Cary relates that after 
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Edward sent Piers Galveston, the Duke of Cornwall and the King’s 
alleged lover, away from the Court, the King’s “wandering eyes now 
ravage[d] through the confines of the great Court, made loose by his 
example.  Here he seeks out some Piece, or Copper metal, whom by his 
Royal stamp he might make current.”137 Fisher suggests that Cary’s use 
of numismatic imagery in this passage—i.e., the ‘stamping’ of a 
“Piece,” which was a “generic term for both coins . . . and sexual 
objects,” as well as the allusion to “Copper metal,” which was 
considered to be a “base metal that was specifically associated with the 
anus”138—nicely conveys Edward’s equally injudicious social and 
sexual transgression.  He says:  
 
[T]he King’s transgression here is not so much the 
stamping itself, but rather the fact that the minion is not 
of the proper mettle, or rank.  Edward’s actions are 
imagined as creating disorder because the base (whether 
metal or man) is given preferment at the expense of the 
noble.  According to Cary, Edward makes base social 
and sexual relations current in the court—the court is 
said to be ‘made loose by his example’—just as he 
makes base coins current in the realm.139
Cary therefore deploys the counterfeiting metaphor to suggest that the 
King is engaging (or desires to engage) in a form of sexual exchange, 
sodomy, that represents a perverse imitation of the ‘true’ and ‘natural’ 
form of “stamping” that characterizes both legitimate coining and
legitimate—i.e., procreative, heterosexual—sex.
The confluence of economic and sexual imagery that marks 
Elizabeth Cary’s historical account of King Edward II similarly appears 
in certain accusations that were hurled at the English playwright, 
Christopher Marlowe, by the informer Richard Baines after the former 
was arrested for atheism in 1593.  In a note given to the Privy Council, 
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the group of advisors who worked closely with Queen Elizabeth, Baines 
accused Marlowe of holding the following irreverent views with respect 
to sodomy and counterfeiting, respectively: (1) that “St John the 
Evangelist was bedfellow to Christ and leaned always in his bosome, 
that he used him as the sinners of Sodoma”; and (2) that “he [Marlowe] 
has as good Right to Coine as the Queen of  
England, and that . . . he ment through help of a Cunninge stamp maker 
to Coin french Crownes and English shillinges.”140 Baines’ 
characterization of Marlowe’s alleged suggestion that Christ and St. 
John were lovers—and thus sinned in the manner of the “sinners of 
Sodoma”—contains language reminiscent of monetary exchange, as “to 
use” was a verb that denoted both expenditure and sexual intercourse 
during the Elizabethan period.141 Conversely, Baines’ characterization 
of Marlowe’s alleged counterfeiting scheme contains language 
reminiscent of sexual exchange, as “to stamp” was a verb that denoted 
both the minting of coins and procreative sexual intercourse—the irony 
here, of course, being that Marlowe was allegedly promoting non-
procreative sexual acts.142 Baines’ accusatory testimony thus not only 
suggests that Marlowe advocated both sodomy and counterfeiting, but 
also describes Marlowe’s alleged sexual and economic crimes in 
interchangeable terms.    
Just as sodomy (and the sodomite) was figured in subversive 
numismatic terms, so, too, was counterfeiting (and the counterfeiter) 
figured in eroticized terms—or, at the very least, in terms that suggest 
that counterfeiting was thought to be a sexualized sin or crime.  One 
English writer of the early seventeenth century recounts that the 
punishment administered to counterfeiters during that time was to have 
their “privy member . . . sundered from [their] body.”143 Another writer 
from around that same time observes that the Normans reserved the 
same punishment—that is, “cutting off . . . [the] genitals”—for “false 
coyners.”144 In other words, the counterfeiter’s punishment rendered 
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him sterile and thereby placed him in the same position of castrato that 
the “homosexual” symbolically occupied.  Moreover, from at least the 
early thirteenth century, castration was also a common punishment in 
several European countries for men who engaged in sodomy.145 Where 
the sodomite’s punishment was intended to prevent him from having 
penetrative sex, however, the counterfeiter’s punishment was intended 
to prevent him “from sexually reproducing.”146 On a symbolic level, his 
punishment “prevented him from breeding false coins.”147 Finally, “[a]s 
the punishment demonstrates, counterfeiters were imagined to be male, 
undoubtedly because the stamping involved in producing coins was 
itself considered to be analogous to male penetration.  According to this 
logic, female stamping (and hence a female counterfeiter) is virtually 
unthinkable.”148 
It bears mentioning that Dante, the early-modern Italian poet, 
chose an historical personage whose name is Master Adam to be his 
representative counterfeiter in the Inferno’s eighth circle of Hell—the 
circle where the fraudulent, including the counterfeiters, are punished.  
A notorious counterfeiter of the Florentine florin who was burned alive 
for his crime in 1281,149 Master Adam’s name surely evokes the 
archetypal Adam whose sin was at once sexual and symbolically 
economic: as Nietzsche reminds us, it is on account of this first man’s 
sexual sin that humanity was forever cast into the position of a debtor 
race charged with seeking spiritual redemption.150 Below, I will return 
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to Dante’s punishment of the counterfeiters that appears in Inferno 30 in 
order to suggest a connection between the early-modern treatment of 
counterfeiting/perverse sexuality and the current representation of 
sexual orientation minorities by certain marriage traditionalists in the 
same-sex marriage debate.  
Based on these select early-modern sources, it would appear that 
the early-modern mind conceptualized sodomy as a kind of
counterfeiting (and vice versa) for two interrelated reasons—each of 
which highlights the non-procreative attributes of the former.   
First, sodomy and counterfeiting together represented unnatural 
and perverted imitations of production—biological reproduction and 
economic/monetary production, respectively.  If sodomy was unnatural 
because it was a form of sex that took place outside the conventional 
context of marital procreation, counterfeiting was unnatural because it 
was a form of coining that took place outside the conventional context 
of economic production.  On a certain level, it made perfect sense for 
early-modern writers to describe sodomy in subversive numismatic 
terms, as the art of coining mimicked the biological, reproductive 
process.  The act of coining—which, as mentioned above, involved the 
“stamping” or imprinting of the monarch on a piece of metal—was 
“similar to the generational act as understood within Aristotelian 
reproductive biology: the active male form impressing itself on female 
matter.”151 Any “stamping” and generation of coins that occurred in the 
absence of regal (and therefore divine) authority was therefore no less 
perverse—and no more naturally procreative—than sodomy itself.  Just 
as the counterfeiter arrogated to himself the King’s (or the state’s) 
prerogative of defining the manner in which money was ‘bred’ and thus 
of ensuring the proper transmission of currency, the sodomite arrogated 
to himself God’s (or Nature’s) prerogative of defining the manner in 
which sex occurred and thus of ensuring the proper transmission of life. 
 Both the counterfeiter and the sodomite, then, not only disrespected 
‘God’s process,’ so to speak, but also generated mere excess—the 
counterfeit coin and non-procreative semen, respectively.   
Second, sodomy and counterfeiting represented not only 
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uneconomical distortions of the natural procreative process, but also an 
unnatural union and generation of similar (or externally identical) 
entities: namely, two same-sex persons and counterfeit money, 
respectively.  For the early-modern—and, as Part IV demonstrates, the 
contemporary—mind, same-sex relations and counterfeiting equally 
represented a non-procreative, narcissistic, and avaricious passion for 
sameness.  Just as same-sex marriage opponents today have highlighted 
the fraudulent aspects of joining together two identical identities that 
cannot procreate,152 so, too, did early-modern thinkers conceptualize 
counterfeiting as an unnatural breeding of the same and a narcissistic 
obsession with the same. 
At this point, I would like to return to Dante’s treatment of the 
counterfeiters that appears in canto 30 of the Inferno—specifically, their 
association with narcissism.  The symbolic representation of 
counterfeiters that appears in that canto is instructive because it 
highlights just that aspect of counterfeiting that often goes unnoticed—
namely, its narcissistic qualities—but that nonetheless renders it a 
suitable analogy to same-sex relations in the eyes of same-sex marriage 
opponents.  As Part IV will explore at length, Dante’s suggestion that 
sterile counterfeiters both generate and accumulate excess in a 
narcissistic and avaricious manner corresponds to the contemporary 
framing of sexual orientation minorities as an intra-relationally sterile 
class that selfishly and narcissistically accumulates tangible resources 
and economic power—and, for that reason, deserves less legal 
protection than other minority groups.  The twin images of the 
‘homosexual as non-procreative sodomite’ and the ‘homosexual as 
greedy narcissist’ not only figure prominently in Justice Scalia’s Romer 
v. Evans dissent—where an image of the homosexual as counterfeiter 
appeared for the first time in constitutional jurisprudence153—but also 
play a dominant role in shoring up the procreation rationale for same-
sex marriage prohibitions today.   
Dante’s allusion to two Ovidian figures who harbored an 
unnatural obsession for similitude—Myrrha and Narcissus—in the same 
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canto where he depicts the counterfeiters is surely no accident.  Early in 
canto 30, Dante is informed by one of the damned that Myrrha, Ovid’s 
infamous daughter who tricked her father into having sex with her by 
impersonating someone else, resides in the eighth circle of hell along 
with the counterfeiters because she “contrived to sin with [her father]  
. . ., counterfeiting in herself another’s person.”154 Later in that same 
canto, Dante alludes to Narcissus when Master Adam tells another 
falsifier, Sinon, who is parched with thirst, that “thou hast burning fever 
and aching head and wouldst need little persuasion to lap Narcissus’ 
mirror.”155 Master Adam’s reference to “Narcissus’ mirror” is, of 
course, an allusion to the legendary Greek youth who fell in love with 
his own reflection and who was punished accordingly when the gods 
turned him into the flower now known as the narcissus.  
The allusions to Myrrha and Narcissus in a canto devoted to the 
sins of counterfeiting specifically, and falsification more generally, are 
neither casual nor gratuitous.  Quite the contrary, Myrrha and Narcissus 
epitomize the same unnatural sexual desire for—and cultivation of—
similitude that the sins (and crimes) of counterfeiting and homosexuality 
symbolically represented.  Myrrha’s incestuous desire for her father 
places her in a position that corresponds to both the counterfeiter and 
the sodomite, as her “counterfeiting” involves a non-normative sexual 
relationship that not only conjoins two similar entities, but does so in a 
way that is thought to pervert nature’s conventional procreative process. 
 As I have argued elsewhere, part of the reason why incest and 
homosexuality are so often linked on the proverbial slippery slope ‘from 
same-sex marriage to incest’156 is because an incestuous relationship is 
like a same-sex relationship in this sense.   
Similarly, Narcissus’ autoeroticism (and latent homosexuality)157 
links him to the counterfeiters, sodomites, and incestuous in two related 
ways: first, his unnatural desire for himself locks him into an entirely 
self-reflexive mode of exchange; and second, that mode of exchange 
represents a perversion—indeed, a refutation—of nature’s procreative 
process.  Ovid makes explicit that Narcissus’ flaw is at once a sexual 
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and an economic one by using monetary language to characterize his 
denial of the nymph, Echo, with whom he might have had a natural, 
procreative sexual relationship.  When Echo—whose fate of quite 
literally becoming an echo ‘mirrors’ that of her beloved and involves a 
replication of ‘the same’ that evokes all of the crimes here discussed—
beseeches Narcissus, Narcissus flees and says: “May I die before my 
riches [copia] is yours.”158 Narcissus here uses the word “copia” to 
convey the “riches” that he would like to keep for himself rather than 
share with Echo; in so doing, Ovid suggests that Narcissus’ sexual 
spurning of her is tantamount to a miserly and excessive accumulation 
of wealth.  The Latin word, “copia,” denotes abundance or plenty159 and 
was the name given to the Roman goddess of abundance (Copia), who 
was identified iconographically by her cornucopia, or horn of plenty—
the same horn that was imprinted on coinage during the reign of 
Emperor Claudius II and that appeared in the hand of Aequitas, a minor 
goddess of fair trade and honest merchants.160 Ovid’s use of this term 
that both symbolically represented money and at one time appeared on
money nicely captures the veritable greed that self-love signifies.  
Indeed, at the very moment that Narcissus realizes that it is himself with 
whom he has fallen in love, he laments his fate by once again using the 
language of copia: “What I desire, I have; the very abundance of my 
riches beggars me [inopem me copia fecit].”161 Here, Ovid strategically 
places two words that derive from the same root—“ops,” which means 
riches, goods, abundance, or plenty162—in a chiastic poetic structure163 
in order to convey the painful double bind in which Narcissus is 
trapped: already possessing that which he cannot truly have.  As I will 
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show, the legal discourse surrounding same-sex marriage prohibitions, 
as well as the procreation rationale for those prohibitions, place sexual 
orientation minorities in this same double bind.  
Ovid’s use of economic language to describe an erotic situation 
that is at once non-procreative, miserly, and bankrupt did not escape the 
attention of Dante, who was most certainly aware of the Roman poet’s 
economic spin on the Greek legend when he chose to include Narcissus 
among the counterfeiters in canto 30 of the Inferno. There is another 
reason, however, why Dante likely found Narcissus to be a suitable 
figure for a canto about falsification generally, and counterfeiting in 
particular.  Here, we must return to the language that Narcissus uses to 
describe the paradoxical situation in which he finds himself.  The same 
Latin word that denotes material abundance, copia, also denotes a copy 
or imitation—as the English “copy” derives from the Latin copia.164 In 
this sense, Narcissus quite literally falls in love with a copy or 
counterfeit of himself when he gazes admiringly upon his reflection in a 
pool of water—a copia which, in turn, he keeps to himself rather than 
exchange it with the outside world.  Dante therefore intimates that those 
who erotically desire a likeness or copy of themselves—Myrrha, 
Narcissus, and the ‘homosexual’ that Narcissus symbolized for early-
modern readers165—are self-counterfeiting in a way that recalls the 
counterfeiter’s unnatural and avaricious breeding of monetary copies.  
Part IV will demonstrate that the current analogy between same-sex 
relations and counterfeiting, as well as the procreation rationale itself, 
similarly reflect a belief that gays and lesbians are ultimately sterile and 
narcissistic—and, as such, uneconomical.  Recent procreationist rhetoric 
is therefore in some very real sense a case of Narcissus redux and of 
history, and myth, repeating itself.  
 
B. Miscegenation and Counterfeiting  
The current deployment of counterfeiting rhetoric in the same-sex 
marriage debate also recalls the legal deployment of counterfeiting 
language in the mid-nineteenth century to describe mixed-race 
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individuals who passed for white.  This historical parallel to the 
contemporary framing of same-sex relations as counterfeit is useful 
because it offers a way to connect miscegenation and same-sex marriage 
on a substantive level in a way that the structural “miscegenation 
analogy” to sexual orientation discrimination has largely overlooked.166 
The miscegenation parallel, moreover, makes a great deal of sense in 
this particular context by virtue of the fact that counterfeiting 
terminology—“to pass counterfeit”—is implicit in the very language of 
racial and sexual orientation passing. According to the Oxford English 
Dictionary, the act of deceiving another person with counterfeit is 
technically referred to as “passing counterfeit” or “to pass 
counterfeit.”167 The act of presenting oneself as white—or straight—to 
the public is also, of course, routinely referred to as “passing.”168
Counterfeiting analogies appear in some nineteenth-century 
cases to denote mixed-race passing as well as fugitive slaves who 
escaped from a slave-holding into a free state.  In one case, State v. 
Anderson,169 the Supreme Court of Missouri considered whether the 
court below erred when it allowed the jury in a rape prosecution to 
determine the race of the victim, as well as the status and race of the 
defendant, merely by looking at them in court and by hearing testimony 
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that the latter was a slave.  In that case, the defendant, “a negro slave,” 
was indicted for “attempt[ing] to ravish a white female,” a crime that 
carried higher penalties than had the defendant been, and the victim not 
been, white.  Although the defendant objected to the trial court’s jury 
instructions—because they permitted the jury to determine the “color, 
sex and race of the prosecuting witness and the defendant” merely on 
the basis of sight and on proof that the defendant was a slave—the trial 
court refused his objections and the jury returned a verdict of guilty and 
a sentence of castration.  In upholding the trial court’s ruling, the 
Supreme Court of Missouri noted that the defendant’s attorneys made 
the following argument on appeal: 
 
The averments in the indictment, that the prosecutrix 
was a white female, and the defendant a negro, were 
material and had to be proved.  The court erred in telling 
the jury they might find that the prosecutrix was a white 
female, from seeing her on the witness stand, and that 
the defendant was a negro, from seeing him in court, and 
proof that he was a slave.  If this be law, then it would 
be proper in a larceny case to instruct the jury that they 
might find the material fact of value from seeing the 
article, or in a case of passing counterfeit money, that 
the money was counterfeit or genuine from seeing it in 
court . . . . Under the statute, the question before the jury 
was not merely one of color, but of race.  Such questions 
are often of the greatest difficulty, requiring for their 
solution scientific skill.  There are albinoes, mulattoes, 
and quadroons, who excel Caucasians in whiteness of 
skin.  Yet, before the jury could convict the defendant, it 
was necessary that they should find that he was a negro, 
and the prosecutrix a Caucasian.  These facts they could 
only find upon proof.  Slavery does not raise the legal 
presumption of black color, although the converse is 
true.170 
It was therefore the defendant’s contention on appeal that, just as the 
 
170 Id. at *3 (emphasis added).  
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state would have to prove that money was truly counterfeit before a jury 
could find a defendant guilty of passing counterfeit money, so, too, must 
the state prove, with “scientific skill,” that the defendant was truly 
black.  Perhaps more important, the state must also prove that the victim 
was truly white—and not, like counterfeit money, someone (a “mulatto” 
or a “quadroon”) who was passing for white.   
 Similar counterfeiting rhetoric appears in State v. Jacobs,171 in 
which the Supreme Court of North Carolina considered whether a lower 
court erred when it permitted a slave-owning witness to testify for the 
state in a criminal case as an “expert” on “the effect of the intermixture 
of negro or African blood with that of other races.”172 In that case, the 
defendant was tried for carrying fire arms as a “free negro,” defined 
statutorily as “one who is ‘descended from negro ancestors to the fourth 
generation inclusive, though one ancestor of each generation may have 
been a white person.’  He may, therefore, be a person who . . . has only a 
sixteenth part of African blood in his veins.”173 To determine whether 
the defendant was a “free negro” (or whether he was “white”) under the 
statute, the prosecution called a witness to testify as an expert in “the 
intermixture of negro or African blood with the white and Indian races,” 
specifically, a slave owner who claimed expertise in “distinguish[ing] 
between the descendants of a negro and a white person, and the 
descendants of a negro and Indian; and further, [who claimed] that he 
could . . . say whether a person was full African or negro, or had more or 
less half negro or African blood in him.”174 To that end, the witness 
testified that, in his opinion, “the defendant was what is called a 
mulatto—that is, half African and half white,”175 and therefore a “free 
negro” under the terms of the criminal statute. 
In upholding the lower court’s decision to admit the testimony as 
‘expert’ evidence,176 the Supreme Court of North Carolina remarked 
that   
 
it appears to be admitted, that the opinion of witnesses, 
 
171 1859 WL 2024 (N.C. 1859).  
172 Id. at *1.  
173 Id. at *2 (citations omitted).  
174 Id. at *1.   
175 Id.
176 See id. at *2.  
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possessing peculiar skill, is admissible whenever the 
subject matter of enquiry is such, that inexperienced 
persons are unlikely to prove capable of forming a 
correct judgment upon it without such assistance.  In 
support of the principles thus announced, it has been 
decided that seal-engravers may be called to give their 
opinion upon an impression, whether it was made from 
an original seal, or from another impression; . . . So, the 
opinion of an artist in painting, is evidence of the 
genuineness of a picture, . . . It has been said that the 
genuineness of a post-mark may be proved by the 
opinion of one who has been in the habit of receiving 
letters with that mark . . . Merchants and bankers, who 
are daily engaged in handling the notes of particular 
banks, and have thus become thoroughly acquainted 
with their whole appearance, may prove whether a 
particular note is genuine or counterfeit . . . Many other 
instances of the application of the principle might be 
given, but those to which we have referred, are sufficient 
to show that it is extensive enough to embrace the case 
now before us.  The effect of the intermixture of the 
blood of different races of people, is surely a matter of 
science, and may be learned by observation and study.  
Nor does it require a distinguished comparative 
anatomist to detect the admixture of the African or 
Indian with the pure blood of the white race.177 
Like the Anderson court, the Jacobs court analogized the “science” of 
determining race—or, more specifically, the difference between 
“admixture” and ‘purity’—to the science of determining the difference 
between a genuine and a fraudulent banknote.  In so doing, it suggested 
that a mixed-race person that passed for a white person was tantamount 
to a counterfeit note that passed for an authentic one.   
 The counterfeiting language that appears in these nineteenth-
century cases that struggled with the anxiety-provoking question of 
racial purity—both in theory and in fact—is surely no accident, as the 
 
177 Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted) (emphasis added).    
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very crime of ‘passing’ counterfeit captured on a linguistic level what 
was so disturbing about multi-racial passing on both an ideological and 
a material level.  Beyond the linguistic connection that counterfeiting 
and multi-racial passing share, however, the idea that ‘non-whites’ were 
analogous to fraudulent currency surely made sense to a legal (and 
cultural) regime that treated non-whites as a form of property.178 In this 
sense, the counterfeiting analogy to multi-racial passing was not just an 
analogy but rather a different way of denoting the commercialization of 
one’s personhood that the institution of slavery represented.  Thus, it 
was not at all strange for a federal district court in Pennsylvania to 
reason that, under the United States Constitution, a slave owner from 
one state had the right to recover his slave, who had absconded to 
another state, by using “every art, device or stratagem to decoy the slave 
into his power” because “[i]t is every day’s practice to detect 
counterfeiters, and those who pass counterfeit money, by employing 
persons to purchase it from them.”179 Here, the court’s characterization 
of the plaintiff’s slave, who had temporarily taken up residence with the 
defendant as “a runaway slave,”180 as counterfeit currency is not just 
metaphorical.  To the contrary, the slave, quite literally the property or 
‘currency’—or, what historian Nell Irvin Painter has nicely termed the 
“embodied currency”181—of the plaintiff-slave owner, is attempting to 
self-counterfeit, or pass, as free in a way that would compromise the 
plaintiff-slave owner’s aggregate wealth.  The court therefore deployed 
a commercial metaphor to capture the truly commercial interests that 
were at stake in that case. 
The historical analogy between counterfeiting and miscegenation 
not only projected an image of the slave (or biracial person) as currency, 
but also reflected a more deep-seated concern over the relationship 
between money and racial equality. Historian Michael O’Malley has 
explored the extent to which “[e]ssentialism—the search for 
fundamental, intrinsic, ‘essential’ categories of being or laws of 
nature—characterized much of nineteenth-century public discourse” 
 
178 For a related phenomenon—i.e., the idea of whiteness as property—see Cheryl I. Harris, 
Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707 (1993).   
179 Johnson v. Tompkins, 13 F. Cas. 840, 843 (E.D. Penn. 1833). 
180 Id. at 840.  
181 Nell Irvin Painter, Thinking About the Languages of Money and Race: A Response to 
Michael O’Malley, “Specie and Species,” AHR FORUM 396, 398 (1994). 
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surrounding race and money.182 O’Malley argues that the intense 
anxiety over the production of greenbacks183 and similar “counterfeit”184 
currency during both the Civil War and the Reconstruction period 
reflected an anxiety over Northerners’ use of “greenback dollars to help 
form biracial governments.”185 Critics of greenbacks often appealed to 
the intrinsic worth of real money—namely, that which was tied to the 
gold standard—of which greenbacks were an inferior substitute or 
counterfeit, even though the latter were authorized by the federal 
government.186 Critics of racial equality routinely used similar language 
when appealing to the intrinsic worth of real ethnic identity—namely, 
the white standard—of which the newly-freed slaves were thought to be 
(by many) an inferior substitute or counterfeit, even though the latter 
were rendered equal to whites (at least in name) by the Fourteenth 
Amendment.187 
Most interestingly, O’Malley observes not only that the two—
greenbacks and the newly-freed slaves—inspired similar fears over “the 
instability of value and identity in American society,”188 but that those 
fears were coterminous.  Critics of greenbacks and racial equality 
contended that the former would help to achieve the latter, even as the 
value of both was derived through artificial means—namely, 
congressional legislation and the Constitution, respectively.  O’Malley 
explains:  
 
182 Michael O’Malley, Specia and Species: Race and the Money Question in Nineteenth-
Century America, AHR FORUM 369 (1994).  
183 “Greenback” was the name given to bank notes issued by Northern banks during the Civil 
War.  Greenbacks were not backed by precious metal (gold and silver) and thus tied to the “gold 
standard,” but rather derived their value by virtue of the fact that Congress approved their 
issuance under the National Banking Act of 1863.  O’Malley observes that “[t]he Union issued 
$450 million in ‘legal tender’ greenbacks during the Civil War.  Backed by nothing more than 
federal authority, the notes had no intrinsic value.  Under the National Banking Act of 1863, the 
Union also taxed state bank notes out of existence, creating a uniform currency for the first time 
. . . . Practically from the date of issue, the greenbacks began depreciating relative to gold.”  
O’Malley, supra note ____, at 378. 
184 Greenbacks were not technically counterfeit because they were issued under federal 
authority. Nevertheless, because “Northerners . . . used greenback dollars to help form biracial 
governments,” greenbacks came to be associated with counterfeit currency—as “the enterprise 
of African-American equality [was connected to] fraudulent or counterfeit bills.”  Id. at 377.  
185 O’Malley, supra note ____, at 377.  
186 See id.
187 See id.
188 O’Malley, supra note _____, at 375.  
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Deploring greenbacks, Henry Adams called “the law of 
legal tender . . . an attempt by artificial legislation to 
make something true which was false.”  Just as no legal 
enactment could create value, no government could 
affect the Negro’s nature.  “No legislation of Congress 
can elevate or improve the physical, moral or intellectual 
condition of the negro,” maintained Senator George 
Vickers of Maryland in 1869.  “We cannot legislate into 
them any fitness or qualifications which they do not now 
possess.” . . . . [By contrast, f]rom the greenback 
perspective, a legal declaration of equality, an 
expression of political or cultural authority, could bring 
about equality just as a congressional declaration of the 
value of paper money could give the paper value.189 
Similarly, “[g]reenbacks symbolized the power of government to 
overturn the natural law arguments that justified slavery.”190 This 
notion that the government cannot legislate ‘value’—be it of money or 
of people—into existence was also behind the Supreme Court’s majority 
opinion in Plessy v. Ferguson, where the Court noted that “[l]egislation 
is powerless to eradicate racial instincts or to abolish distinctions based 
on physical difference.”191 While the Fourteenth Amendment might 
have granted Plessy legitimacy in the form of citizenship, and while 
Plessy might have ‘passed’ for white, his ‘passing’ was deemed no more 
legitimate than the passing of counterfeit currency.  
Below, I will suggest that both counterfeiting rhetoric and the 
procreation rationale are, on a symbolic level, repeating the history of 
racial miscegenation.  To be sure, same-sex marriage advocates, and 
some courts, have long recognized the structural similarities between 
race and sexual-orientation discrimination from a doctrinal 
standpoint.192 Moreover, in some instances, the miscegenation analogy 
 
189 O’Malley, supra note ____, at 378, 379.  
190 Id. at 383.   
191 163 U.S. 537 (1896).   O’Malley discusses Plessy v. Ferguson in similar terms.  See supra 
note ______, at 395.  
192 See supra note _____, and accompanying text.   
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has proven quite successful as a litigation strategy.193 Nevertheless, 
because commentators have focused almost exclusively on the 
similarities between racial and sexual orientation discrimination, they 
have missed the more substantive connections that exist between the 
practice of miscegenation and same-sex procreation per se. The 
following Part will suggest that courts are increasingly talking about 
same-sex procreation as a kind of miscegenation unto itself.  For this 
reason, the miscegenation analogy offers a valuable way to understand 
how same-sex marriage is a counterfeit and how the procreation 
rationale operates to prevent marriage miscegenation.  
 
IV. THE LEGACY OF THE COUNTERFEITING ANALOGY IN THE 
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE DEBATE: NARCISSUS AND MISCEGENATION 
REVISITED 
How does the history behind the counterfeiting analogy help us 
to understand the current deployment of counterfeiting rhetoric in the 
same-sex marriage debate?  More important, how does it clarify the 
work that the procreation rationale is doing in shoring up same-sex 
marriage prohibitions today?  This Part explores and answers these 
questions by looking more closely at the way in which history is 
repeating itself on two levels.  First, Section A uses the historical 
casting of sodomy as counterfeit to explain why non-procreative sex is 
such a concern for marriage traditionalists and for many courts, namely, 
because it allows those who engage in ‘homosexual conduct’ to acquire 
riches and political power that the rest of the population lacks.  Because 
same-sex couples therefore have more political clout, they need less by 
way of legal protection.  In this sense, same-sex couples are modern 
avatars of Narcissus: simultaneously having too much and not enough.  
Section B uses the historical casting of miscegenation as counterfeit to 
explain why same-sex families are such a concern for marriage 
traditionalists and for many courts, namely, because they attempt to 
‘pass’ for the ‘real’ marriage archetype.  In this sense, same-sex couples 
 
193 See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 63 (Haw. 1993) (finding that Hawaii’s same-sex marriage 
prohibition constituted an impermissible form of sex discrimination under the state constitution 
and comparing that prohibition to the criminal miscegenation statute at issue in Loving v. 
Virginia).   
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are repeating the crime of miscegenation: engaging in an artificial form 
of procreation that attempts to pass itself off for the real thing.  
A. The Power of Non-Procreative Sex: Narcissus Redux 
 
The early-modern treatment of sodomy and counterfeiting (both 
together and singly) helps to explain the contemporary framing of the 
same-sex marriage debate as well as the legal treatment of same-sex 
marriage prohibitions in at least three interrelated ways.  I should note 
here that I am not suggesting that either contemporary counterfeiting 
rhetoric or the procreation rationale flow consciously and deliberately 
from, say, Ovid and Dante.  Rather, what I am suggesting is that the 
counterfeiting analogy and the procreation rationale are better 
understood in light of the ‘procreative’ logic that underlies both, and 
that the early-modern treatment of sodomy and counterfeiting helps to 
elucidate that logic.  To return to Yoshino, the symbol of the 
counterfeiter that emerges from Dante’s economic casting of the 
Narcissus myth provides a “‘thicker’ response” to the procreation 
rationale for same-sex marriage prohibitions than strictly ‘legal’ 
criticisms of that rationale have permitted.194 
First, and as discussed at greater length above, sodomy and 
counterfeiting were considered to be analogous modes of exchange that 
did not follow nature’s/the state’s procreative process: if the latter 
represented a perverse imitation of the way in which the state naturally 
bred or ‘procreated’ currency, the former was arguably worse because it 
did not guarantee any procreation even though it was an equally 
perverse imitation of the way in which a cross-sex couple reproduced.  
This early-modern notion that sodomy amounts to counterfeit because it 
is non-procreative conforms to the contemporary framing of same-sex 
marriage as counterfeit on account of the fact that it is not “inherently 
procreative.”195 To recall the remarks of one same-sex marriage 
opponent: “Same-sex marriages are counterfeit, immoral, totally sterile, 
lacking the No. 1 reason for marriage—procreation—ignoring the 
 
194 Yoshino, supra note ______, at 1756. 
195 Supra note _____.   
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wisdom of ages and common sense.”196 
Second, and relatedly, the early-modern sources suggest that 
non-procreative sodomy represented a threat to the continuity of the 
state no less than counterfeiting represented a threat to the continuity of 
the state’s currency.  In his examination of sodomy and male 
homosexuality in Renaissance England, Sodometries: Renaissance 
Texts, Modern Sexualities, Jonathan Goldberg has observed that 
“sodomy is, as a sexual act, anything that threatens alliance—any sexual 
act, that is, that does not promote the aims of married procreative 
sex.”197 Indeed, 
 
[a]s the term [sodomy] was repeatedly invoked and came 
to take on a whole variety of linked but distinct 
meanings, those meanings always operated by an 
analogy, however distant, to the original notion of the 
sodomite as a destroyer of that most basic unit of the 
social fabric, the procreative, married, heterosexual 
couple.198 
Early-modern sources therefore reveal not only the extent to which the 
counterfeiting analogy reflects a fear about procreation, but also why the 
non-procreative attributes of sodomy pose such a threat—namely, 
because of their capacity to undermine “that most basic unit of the social 
fabric, the procreative, married, heterosexual couple.”199 The 
procreation rationale for same-sex marriage prohibitions similarly rests 
on this idea that same-sex relationships (and their intrinsic non-
procreativity) threaten to destroy this “most basic unit of the social 
fabric.”  As Justice Cordy reasoned in his Goodridge dissent:  “[A] 
society without the institution of marriage, in which heterosexual 
intercourse, procreation, and child care are largely disconnected 
processes, would be chaotic.”200 
196 Supra note _____.   
197 JONATHAN GOLDBERG, SODOMETRIES: RENAISSANCE TEXTS, MODERN SEXUALITIES (1992).  
198 Jody Greene, “You Must Eat Men”: The Sodomitic Economy of Renaissance Patronage, 1
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200 Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 996 (Mass. 2003) (Cordy, J., 
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Third, the early-modern notion that counterfeiters are 
uneconomical narcissists conforms to the contemporary framing of gays 
and lesbians as selfish and narcissistic because of the non-procreative 
‘homosexual conduct’ in which they presumably engage.  Rhetorical 
and legal claims centering on the alleged narcissism and affluence of 
gays and lesbians have assumed a variety of forms, some more 
incendiary than others.  For instance, sexual orientation minorities have 
at times been accused of being narcissists (or narcissistic) because they 
are thought to flout certain religious and moral tenets in favor of an 
alternative “lifestyle” that runs directly counter to those tenets.  As Pat 
Robertson, founder of the Christian Coalition of America, recently 
remarked: “[Homosexuals are] self-absorbed narcissists who are willing 
to destroy any institution so long as they can have affirmation of their 
lifestyle.”201 Or, in the words of the Family Research Council: “The 
activist homosexual agenda and worldview are fundamentally 
incompatible with Christianity or any form of true religion, because 
homosexuality is ultimately narcissism.  It denies the nature of our 
bodies and the nature of our spirits.”202 
More often than not, however, the language of narcissism and 
avarice is less inflammatory and ironically appears to cast sexual 
orientation minorities/same-sex couples in a positive light with respect 
to their enhanced economic resources.  Justice Scalia’s insistent focus in 
his Romer v. Evans dissent on gays and lesbians’ so-called 
“disproportionate political power” and “high disposable income”—the 
former of which is likely a consequence of the latter, in his estimation, 
and both of which militate against enhanced judicial protection for 
sexual orientation minorities—evokes the early-modern image of the 
sterile, narcissistic, and avaricious counterfeiter.203 In his words: 
 
201 Robertson: Gays and Lesbians Are “Self-Absorbed Narcissists” Responsible For No-Fault 
Divorce and Abortion, MediaMatters For America, at  
http://mediamatters.org/items/200508170006 (Aug. 17, 2005).   
202 Protest and Reparation in Manhattan, The American Society for the Defense of Tradition, 
Family and Property, http://www.tfp.org/anf/anti_blasphemy/corpus.htm (Sept.-Oct. 1998) 
(remarks of Steve Schwalm).   
203 Justice Scalia’s casting of “homosexuals” as a “politically powerful minority” that aggregates 
in powerful sub-communities—which, in turn, facilitate political mobilization—represents an 
inversion of  the relationship between minority status (and the conditions that ordinarily flow 
from it) and political power as set forth in U.S. v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144 n.4 (1938). 
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The problem (a problem, that is, for those who wish to 
retain social disapprobation of homosexuality) is that, 
because those who engage in homosexual conduct tend 
to reside in disproportionate numbers in certain 
communities, . . . have high disposable income, . . . and, 
of course, care about homosexual-rights issues much 
more ardently than the public at large, they possess 
political power much greater than their numbers, both 
locally and statewide.  Quite understandably, they devote 
this political power to achieving not merely a grudging 
social toleration, but full social acceptance, of 
homosexuality.”204 
Justice Scalia here relies on what has come to be known as the “myth” 
of gay affluence,205 that is, the widely-held belief that sexual orientation 
minorities have more money and consequently more political power 
than “the public at large”—the “public,” like the “seemingly tolerant 
Coloradans” in Romer, whose “modest” attempts at lawmaking are 
outweighed by the mobilization of a “politically powerful minority.”206 
This myth of gay affluence or gay narcissism, which has enjoyed 
some success in the courts,207 casts gays and lesbians in a role not unlike 
that reserved for the early-modern counterfeiter.  The myth not only 
promotes the idea that sexual orientation minorities are greedy and 
narcissistic as compared to the “modest” citizens who possess relatively 
less political power and fewer resources, but also highlights the non-
procreative “homosexual conduct” in which they engage—the same 
 
204 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 645-46 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also id. at 636 
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non-procreative (read: counterfeit) conduct which, in turn, leads to the 
selfish accumulation of wealth.  More specifically, Justice Scalia 
suggests that a causal link exists between sexual orientation minorities’ 
non-procreative “homosexual conduct” and their “high disposable 
income”—resources surely not spent on any children born from a same-
sex relationship, but rather on political mobilization.  In this sense, the 
myth of gay affluence rests on the same logic as does the counterfeiting 
analogy itself: sex that represents an uneconomical, narcissistic, and 
non-procreative obsession with “copies” ironically generates financial 
copia. In addition, and more interesting still, the myth of gay affluence 
has been deployed in such a way so as to deprive sexual orientation 
minorities of the benefit of heightened judicial scrutiny and therefore of 
certain legal rights.  Because ‘barren’ and ‘childless’ sexual orientation 
minorities are presumed to possess more resources and political power 
than other citizens, they ostensibly need less by way of legal protection. 
 The myth therefore places them in the same double bind in which 
Narcissus, a symbolic counterfeiter, finds himself: possessing a surplus 
of resources that renders them legally powerless.   
Significantly, the myth of gay affluence/gay narcissism has 
found its way into the more recent same-sex marriage cases as well as 
the critical commentary surrounding the same-sex marriage debate.  
While the language of narcissism that the myth inspires is not always 
explicit in the cases and commentary, it nevertheless surfaces in the 
following three ways.  
First, states sometimes advert to the allegedly superior economic 
position of same-sex couples relative to cross-sex couples in support of 
their same-sex marriage prohibitions.  For instance, in Goodridge, the 
state attempted (unsuccessfully) to justify its same-sex marriage 
prohibition by relying, in part, on a rationale that foregrounded gays and 
lesbians’ ostensible economic surplus—a surplus which, in the state’s 
view, entitled them to less protection.  As the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts noted, “[t]he marriage restriction is rational, [the state] 
argues, because the General Court logically could assume that same-sex 
couples are more financially independent than married couples and thus 
less needy of public marital benefits.”208 
Second, the private welfare version of the procreation rationale 
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assumes that same-sex couples possess an abundance of resources—
financial and otherwise—which allow them to engage in responsible 
procreation.  For instance, the Morrison court observed that same-sex 
couples may become parents through “‘artificial’ reproduction methods 
[which are] frequently costly and time-consuming.”209 In a footnote, the 
court remarked that two women may reproduce by relying on in vitro 
fertilization (IVF)—one cycle of which “has been estimated at 
$12,400.”210 Alternatively, a same-sex couple may choose to adopt, 
which costs “as much as $40,000 or more.”211 In other words, Morrison 
recognized that artificial procreation is not only more responsible—but 
more costly as well.  Its analysis of that rationale rests on the 
assumption that same-sex couples who are reproducing already possess 
the financial resources to invest in child-bearing; for this reason, they do 
not need marital rights.  Once again, gays and lesbians are placed in a 
situation where their non-procreative, ‘counterfeit’ sex guarantees them 
riches (or copia) which, in turn, render them bereft of legal protection.   
Third and last, critics of same-sex marriage have at times 
adverted to the myth of gay affluence/gay narcissism in order to defend 
a contrary position, namely, that same-sex couples should not be 
awarded marital rights because they are not investing their resources in 
having and raising children.  Whereas the Morrison court at least 
suggests that same-sex couples are overinvesting in child-bearing by 
spending upwards of $12,400 for one IVF cycle (noting also that “it 
frequently takes multiple cycles in order to succeed”212) or “as much as 
$40,000 or more”213 to adopt, some opponents of same-sex marriage 
have argued that same-sex couples underinvest because they allegedly 
do not bear the costs of having and raising children.  Under this view, 
same-sex couples are hoarding their resources in a narcissistic and self-
centered way.   
Professor Douglas Kmiec is one such exponent of the latter 
view.  In support of the ‘procreation as propagation’ rationale for same-
sex marriage prohibitions, Kmiec has recently likened all advocates of 
same-sex marriage to the legendarily narcissistic Manichees, a third-
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century religious sect that  
 
subscribed to the notion that human beings were sparks 
of light or energy that were imprisoned by the created 
world order.  Good in a Manichean society took the form 
of defying created human nature, including procreative 
intercourse.  The Manichees in essence taught that it was 
salutary to hate one’s body.  The Manichees not 
surprisingly did not have a large impact upon the social 
order of their time, or any other, but their self-
centeredness was certainly part of the Roman order, 
which indulged numerous sexual practices, including 
prostitution, homosexual relations, and masturbation.214 
Furthermore, Kmiec has argued that it would be unfair to extend marital 
rights to these ‘self-centered’ and ‘Manichean’ same-sex couples 
because, in his view, they do not bear the financial responsibility of 
raising children: “[T]oday, traditional parents make an investment of 
over $200,000 (exclusive of college) to bring up a child to age 18, and 
yet, they often receive the same economic benefits as those who do not 
invest in raising children.  Adding an increased number of childless 
[married] homosexual partners to the mix makes matters worse.”215 
Similarly, Professor George Dent has remarked that “[b]ecause gay 
couples do not bear children . . . many gay marriages would be 
marriages of convenience entered into primarily for the tangible 
benefits.”216 Moreover, it is partly on account of the inherent ‘sterility’ 
of same-sex marriage that Dent has labeled that relationship “of 
convenience” a “burlesque,” a “mere parody,” and a “caricature of the 
real thing.”217 Where Morrison therefore sees surfeit (or overinvestment 
in children), Kmiec and Dent see lack (or underinvestment in children).  
Nevertheless, under both views, same-sex couples have too much to 
spend in large part because they engage in a kind of sex whose non-
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procreative attributes allow for the disproportionate accumulation of 
wealth—the “high disposable income” to which Justice Scalia alluded in 
his Romer dissent.  
When viewed through the lens of the counterfeiting trope and its 
history, the procreation rationale for same-sex marriage prohibitions is 
in some very real sense repeating the history of sodomy regulation.  
While the rhetorical strategies have shifted from disgust to counterfeit—
or what Didi Herman has termed a shift from a rhetoric of purity to a 
rhetoric of pragmatism218—the underlying assumptions are the same.  In 
the current same-sex marriage debate, sexual orientation minorities do 
not need the protections of the law because they engage in non-
procreative (and narcissistic) conduct that confers upon them monetary 
privilege and power—the very same reasoning that largely fueled Justice 
Scalia’s Romer dissent and traces of which appear in his Lawrence v. 
Texas dissent.219 Given the history behind the counterfeiting trope and 
its integral association with non-procreative sex, it is no surprise that an 
image of the counterfeiter surfaces in these two dissenting opinions 
which deal either implicitly or quite explicitly with same-sex conduct.  
The early-modern image that perhaps best captures the extent to 
which history is repeating itself (on many levels) is that of the usurer 
with a mouthful of feces.  While not a counterfeiter, the usurer—i.e., he
who lends money at interest—was nevertheless someone who, for the 
early-modern mind, committed an economic crime (and sin) that 
connected him to the sodomites and brought him within sodomy’s 
ambit.  The early-modern association between usury and sodomy 
followed from Aristotle, for whom usury was “the birth of money from 
money” and “of all modes of making money . . . the most unnatural.”220 
Strange bedfellows, the usurers and the sodomites had one thing in 
common: they both generated excess through unnatural means. Where 
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the sodomite produced and exchanged semen in a non-reproductive 
way, the usurer produced and exchanged money in a legendarily 
unnatural way—as his riches increased purely by dint of interest rather 
than by dint of investment.221 In a sense, the usurer was the inverse of 
the sodomite: where the former turned an otherwise sterile product 
(money) into something fruitful, the latter turned an otherwise fruitful 
product (semen) into something sterile.  Nevertheless, and not 
coincidentally, Dante places the usurers and the sodomites together in 
the same level of hell above the counterfeiters, where they are punished 
for violating “Nature” and “God’s art,” respectively, and  
where they both reside on a burning plain—an image of the sterility that 
marks their unnatural economic and sexual activity.222 
Medieval historian, Jacques Le Goff, describes the image of the 
usurer that appears in the fresco of Hell in the Collegiate Church of San 
Gimignano, Italy, as someone who is orally ingesting the devil’s 
excrement—excrement which turns out to be gold coins—and who is 
placed alongside a sodomite who is himself orally ingesting semen.223 
The image of the usurer with a mouth laden with the devil’s excrement 
recalls the image of the ‘feces-eating’ homosexual that surfaced in the 
rhetorical campaign surrounding the passage of Colorado’s Amendment 
2224—an image that at least implicitly appears in Justice Scalia’s Romer 
dissent, which at once highlights homosexual conduct (feces ‘eating’) 
and homosexual power (coin collecting).  It also conveys the disgust 
that we might feel when in the company of a swindler—thus explaining 
the modern slang that we use to describe someone who is, in Professor 
William Ian Miller’s words, “faking it.”225 (It also explains, at least in 
part, why Leon Kass has characterized the duplicative—and 
duplicitous—reproductive practice of cloning as “repugnant”).226 More 
than this, the image of the commercial fraudster full of feces (and placed 
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next to a sodomite) perfectly captures the Janus-faced discourse that has 
marked the construction of sexual orientation minorities in the law over 
the last ten years: a class whose non-procreative activity renders it at 
once a source of disgust and a paradigm of fraud—or, perhaps more 
accurately, a class whose non-procreative fraud inspires disgust.  
However we flip the proverbial coin, the history behind the association 
between abnormal sexuality and economic fraud—as well as the 
resurgence of that history in the same-sex marriage debate—brings us 
back full circle to sodomy and its non-procreative attributes. 
 
B. Marriage Miscegenation 
 
The historical analogy between miscegenation and counterfeiting 
helps to explain the more recent, private welfare version of the 
procreation rationale—one that has stumped commentators, and some 
judges, because it ironically places same-sex couples in a superior 
position relative to their cross-sex counterparts. Indeed, how might we 
explain the tortured logic that assumes that same-sex couples do not 
need the protections of the law because they are better than straight 
couples when it comes to having children?  The Narcissus myth and the 
double bind it projects already supplies us with one answer, namely, 
same-sex couples do not need the protections of the law because they 
already have monetary power and the privileges that flow from it.  The 
miscegenation analogy, however, supplies us with a better answer, 
namely, same-sex couples and the superior form of procreation in which 
they engage is allowing them to look too much like the cross-sex family 
paradigm.  As such, the procreation rationale increasingly functions to 
prevent marriage-miscegenation and same-sex marriage passing.   
Part I argued that the more recent version of the procreation 
rationale reflects an implicit fear of the reality of same-sex procreation.  
While some courts have continued to emphasize the extent to which 
same-sex reproduction is different from the cross-sex paradigm,227 most 
courts that have upheld same-sex marriage prohibitions on the basis of 
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this rationale are increasingly recognizing that same-sex couples are 
reproducing and having families through asexual means.  In Hernandez,
for example, the lower court stated that “the reality is that significant 
numbers of couples in New York have formed same-sex families, and 
numerous couples will continue to do so, whether they are allowed to 
marry or not.”228 Even those courts that have upheld same-sex marriage 
prohibitions on the basis of encouraging responsible procreation have 
recognized the reality of same-sex families. In Standhardt, for instance, 
the court recognized that “some same-sex couples also raise children,” 
even as it concluded that the “exclusion of these couples from the 
marriage relationship does not defeat the reasonableness of the link 
between opposite-sex marriage, procreation, and child-rearing.”229 
Similarly, in Lewis v. Harris, in which the New Jersey Superior Court 
upheld that state’s same-sex marriage prohibition partly on the basis of 
procreation, Judge Collester, in dissent, stated bluntly that “[t]he fact is 
some persons in committed same-sex relationships can and do legally 
and functionally procreate . . . [The plaintiffs] in this case . . . each gave 
birth to their children following artificial insemination.”230 The very 
thing that rendered same- and cross-sex partners intrinsically different 
and that justified differential treatment of those two classes from a 
constitutional perspective in the early same-sex marriage cases—the 
ability to procreate—is the same thing that is starting to bridge the gap 
between them.   
A burgeoning anxiety that same-sex families are beginning to 
look too much like, and therefore passing as, the cross-sex family 
paradigm has accompanied the courts’ (and the public’s) increased 
awareness of the reality of same-sex procreation.  Such a fear is 
reflected in contemporary counterfeiting rhetoric and the emphasis that 
it often places on deceptive imitation—for instance, Robert Knight’s 
remarks that “if [same-sex partnerships are] called marriage, it’s a 
counterfeit version.  And counterfeit versions drive out the real 
thing.”231 Such a fear is also reflected in the private welfare procreation 
rationale for same-sex marriage prohibitions.  Because the private 
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welfare procreation rationale captures the reality that same-sex couples 
are reproducing, it raises the specter that they are, or at least might be, 
passing for ‘real’ families.   
As mentioned, the private welfare procreation rationale 
sometimes casts same-sex procreation as a better version or product 
than its cross-sex counterpart.  For instance, while the Morrison court 
remarked in a footnote that the methods of same-sex child-bearing—
artificial reproduction and adoption—involve significant costs, it also 
implied that the couples who avail themselves of such methods might be 
better parents because of their substantial investment ex ante:
Those persons who have invested the significant time, 
effort, and expense associated with assisted reproduction 
or adoption may be seen as very likely to be able to 
provide [a stable environment for children], with or 
without the “protections” of marriage, because of the 
high level of financial and emotional commitment 
exerted in conceiving or adopting a child or children in 
the first place.232 
Once again, same-sex couples need less (legal protection) because they 
have invested more (financial and emotional resources).  What is most 
interesting here from the perspective of the counterfeiting analogy to 
same-sex relations, however, is the suggestion that the “artificial” 
reproductive imitation (or counterfeit) has not diluted or devalued the 
real thing but rather surpassed it. When viewed in this light, the 
counterfeit is not a counterfeit at all but rather a completely new (and 
better) product.  The Morrison court’s explicit casting of same-sex 
reproduction as an “artificial” imitation that is better than the “natural” 
paradigm—an image of procreation that has appeared in other cases that 
have upheld same-sex marriage prohibitions on the basis of this 
rationale233—thus ironically conflicts with the image of same-sex 
reproduction that emerges from counterfeiting rhetoric more generally: 
namely, an unworthy replica of the real thing.   
At the same time, however, the private welfare rationale also 
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works in concert with the notion that same-sex marriage not only is a 
degraded form of the real thing, but also devalues the real thing. For 
instance, in Lewis, the New Jersey Superior Court upheld that state’s 
same-sex marriage prohibition by adverting, in part, to the rational basis 
of encouraging responsible procreation—even though, it bears noting, 
the Attorney General of New Jersey “disclaim[ed] the promotion of 
procreation as a rationale for prohibiting same-sex marriage.”234 In so 
doing, a concurring opinion remarked that the most “vital” purpose of 
marriage is “to control or ameliorate [procreation’s] consequences—the 
so-called ‘private welfare’ purpose.”235 The opinion went on to suggest 
that it is this procreative function of cross-sex marriage that renders that 
relationship “meaningful” and that confers upon it a “‘specialness’” that 
same-sex marriage (and the artificial reproduction that may occur within 
that context) lacks.236 Under this view, cross-sex marriage derives its 
uniqueness by virtue of the kind of procreation that it both guarantees 
and protects.  Procreation is no longer about propagation of the species 
but rather about preserving the uniqueness of the relationship in which it 
ideally occurs.   
Moreover, and as the opinion further notes, it would dilute the 
distinctiveness of the original marital model to recognize relationships 
where procreation does not occur between two unrelated, cross-sex 
individuals.  Perhaps speculating on the substance of those “other 
reasons  . . . to promote the institution of marriage” to which Justice 
O’Connor alluded in her Lawrence v. Texas concurrence,237 the Lewis 
concurrence stated that “there are reasons for limiting unfettered access 
to marriage.  Otherwise, by allowing the multiplicity of human choices 
that bear no resemblance to marriage to qualify, the institution would 
become non-recognizable and unable to perform its vital function [of 
controlling or ameliorating the consequences of cross-sex 
procreation].”238 By preserving the unique and ‘special’ connection that 
exists among marriage, cross-sex intercourse, and procreation, the 
 
234 Lewis, 875 A.2d at 284.   
235 Id. at 276 (Parrillo, J.A.D., concurring).   
236 Id. at 277 (Parrillo, J.A.D., concurring).   
237 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 585 (2003) (stating that “other reasons exist to 
promote the institution of marriage beyond mere moral disapproval of an excluded group”) 
(O’Connor, J., concurring).  
238 Lewis, 875 A.2d at 277. 
70
private welfare rationale thus ensures that a marriage copy—a state-
sanctioned relationship, for example, where procreation between two 
people does not occur through sexual means—does not render the 
original on which it is based “non-recognizable.”  Instead of ensuring 
the continuation of society, procreation is now being deployed to ensure 
the continuation of marriage.  Sexual procreation no longer figures as a 
necessary condition of marriage.  Rather, marriage is a necessary 
condition of sexual procreation—and only sexual procreation.  
The emphasis here placed on the uniqueness of cross-sex 
procreation (within the marital context) invites us to consider same-sex 
procreation as an artificial counterfeit of the former that devalues—and 
dilutes—it in the process of imitating it.  The language that the 
concurring opinion uses to describe what would happen were the state to 
recognize a form of marriage that does not promote the “vital purpose” 
of encouraging responsible procreation reflects a situation analogous to 
the introduction of counterfeit currency into the market.  Specifically, 
the recognition of same-sex marriage would cause the uniqueness of the 
“institution” of marriage to fade—“to become non-recognizable and 
unable to perform its vital function”—in a way that recalls the power of 
a counterfeit to compromise the distinctiveness and efficacy of the real 
thing.  
If we push the counterfeiting analogy a bit further, however, the 
concurring opinion’s fear that artificial substitutes that “bear no 
resemblance” to marriage will render marriage less distinctive  makes 
no more sense than does the counterfeiting analogy to civil unions and 
same-sex marriage.  As Part II.B queried, if civil unions are not called 
marriage, and if same-sex marriage is legally the same as cross-sex 
marriage, then how do civil unions and same-sex marriage operate as 
counterfeit?  So, too, here: if same-sex marriage truly “bears no 
resemblance to [cross-sex] marriage,” then how could it possibly render 
that archetypal institution “non-recognizable”?  Put another way, how 
does an imitation pass for—and, in the process, dilute—an original if it 
is not really an imitation at all?  
The historical linking of counterfeiting and miscegenation 
surveyed in Part III offers a way to understand just what is going on in 
the Lewis concurrence and what is really behind the procreative fear that 
it projects.  Nineteenth-century counterfeiting rhetoric captured, in part, 
what was so threatening about the consequences of miscegenation—
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namely, the creation of an individual (like Homer Plessy) who, in the 
eyes of essentialists, did not bear any resemblance to a white man but 
who was nevertheless qualifying (or passing) as one.  In the process, the 
value of ‘whiteness’ became “non-recognizable and unable to perform 
its vital function” of maintaining racial hierarchy.  The irony, of course, 
is that Homer Plessy did resemble the white man whom he was, in the 
eyes of essentialists, trying to imitate because Homer Plessy was, in fact, 
biracial. The point here is that traditional marriage in the Lewis 
concurrence—and in the eyes of marriage traditionalists more 
generally—assumes the same position that whiteness did for nineteenth-
century essentialists.  Like ethnic miscegenation, ‘marriage 
miscegenation’ produces copies that pass for the real thing—and, in the 
process, render the real thing less distinctive.  In recognizing the reality 
of same-sex procreation and the danger that it poses, the private welfare 
rationale therefore acts as ‘barrier’ that prevents marriage-mixing.  It is 
for precisely this reason that the Lewis concurrence also remarks that the 
state must “draw[] principled boundaries”239 around the traditional 
institution of marriage in order to preserve its unique, procreative 
function. 
I would like to conclude here by briefly offering two additional 
reasons for why the miscegenation analogy to same-sex marriage makes 
sense on a more substantive level—each of which returns to the 
counterfeiting analogy.  First, marriage traditionalists have deployed 
counterfeiting rhetoric in the same-sex marriage debate in a way that is 
uniquely tied to an anxiety over subversive and deceptive reproduction.  
As Part II set forth at length, lawmakers and same-sex marriage 
opponents label same-sex couples as counterfeit in large part because 
they engage in non-procreative sex that mimics the real thing and 
because they produce families that attempt to pass for the real thing.  It 
is surely no coincidence that opponents of reproductive cloning, a 
prospective practice that is routinely characterized as deceptive and 
fraudulent—and, as with same-sex relationships, repugnant because it is 
deceptive and fraudulent240—associate that technology specifically with 
same-sex couples.241 Cloning represents just those aspects of same-sex 
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procreation that are most threatening—i.e., a narcissistic obsession with 
the same, the deceptive reproduction of the same—writ large.   
Similar reproductive concerns, of course, inspired lawmakers to 
criminalize miscegenation.  In Loving v. Virginia, the state of Virginia 
argued, and the Appeals court agreed, that its criminal anti-
miscegenation statute was necessary in order to prevent a “mongrel 
breed of citizens.”242 In State v. Jackson, the Supreme Court of 
Missouri went so far as to claim that miscegenation, like sodomy, 
defeated procreation.  As the court stated: “It is stated as a well 
authenticated fact that if the issue of a black man and a white woman, 
and a white man and a black woman, intermarry, they cannot possibly 
have any progeny.”243 Although miscegenation was, historically, a 
reproductive ‘practice’ that represented the mixing of two entities that 
were not too alike but rather too different, it nevertheless equally 
signified an illegitimate (and therefore counterfeit) form of 
reproduction.  For instance, a colonial law that prevented 
“intermarriage” between blacks and whites in Massachusetts, entitled 
“An Act for the Better Preventing of a Spurious and Mixed Issue,”244 
highlighted just this deceptiveness of mixed-race reproduction.  Like 
today, in 1705 “spurious” denoted “a sham or a counterfeit” as well as 
non-marital progeny.245 
Second, the nineteenth-century anxiety that surrounded 
counterfeit (or greenback) currency, racial equality, and the “artificial 
legislation” that would ostensibly guarantee both finds its counterpart in 
the recent anxiety over same-sex marriage.  Not only is same-sex 
marriage, like mixed-race persons and newly-freed slaves, 
conceptualized in terms of counterfeit, but both the rhetoric and the 
legal analysis that often surrounds same-sex marriage highlights the fact 
that the law simply cannot change what is the ‘naturally given’ marital 
paradigm.  Same-sex marriage opponents routinely invoke natural law 
arguments to justify both what the current legal regime is and should 
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be.246 Moreover, like the nineteenth-century essentialists, they also 
suggest that a positive law that recognizes same-sex marriage is (or 
would be) fraudulent because it contravenes natural law.  It is for 
precisely this reason that Professor Wardle has suggested that “a state 
that confers the legal status of marriage upon same-sex unions commits 
fraud when it presents a false image of same-sex unions as comparable 
to traditional marriage.”247 The Concerned Women for America 
expressed a similar concern when it remarked that the original Federal 
Marriage Amendment as drafted “would result in legalized counterfeit 
marriage”248—relying on the oxymoronic phrase, “legalized 
counterfeit,” to highlight the state’s role in perpetrating a fraud upon the 
public.249 Under these views, a legal regime that condones same-sex 
marriage passing is no less fraudulent than the counterfeiter herself.250 
V.  NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS AND QUEERING THE DOUBLE 
BIND 
This Article has shown that the counterfeiting trope is 
descriptively inaccurate as applied to same-sex relationships: same-sex 
marriage is, quite simply, not a counterfeit.  At the same time, however, 
this Article has also shown that the counterfeiting trope makes sense in 
light of its history: same-sex marriage is, in fact, a counterfeit for the 
same reasons that both sodomy and miscegenation once were (and, in 
the case of sodomy, continues to be). Having surveyed the history 
behind counterfeiting rhetoric and used that history to explain the 
 
246 See, e.g., Gerard V. Bradley, Law and the Culture of Marriage, 18 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS 
& PUB. POL’Y 189, 194 (2004); Robert P. George & Gerard V. Bradley, Marriage and the 
Liberal Imagination, 84 GEO. L.J. 301, 305 (1995). 
247 Wardle, supra note _____, at 775 (emphasis added).  
248 Supra note _____ (emphasis added).  
249 Professor Kmiec has characterized San Francisco Mayor, Gavin Newsom’s, decision to hand 
out “counterfeit” marriage licenses to same-sex couples in violation of California law in 2004 as 
an instance where the “bald-faced claims of counterfeit equality overlook[ed] the 
irreplaceability of the civilizing agency of the traditional family altogether.”  Maria Kennedy, 
San Francisco’s Gay Revolution, San Francisco Faith (Apr. 2004), at 
http://www.sffaith.com/ed/articles/2004/0404mk.htm (remarks of Professor Douglas Kmiec).   
250 It is worth noting that in 1980, a court that looked favorably upon same-sex marriage 
prohibitions felt otherwise when it suggested that only “an affirmative enactment of Congress” 
could lead to a situation where same-sex relationships are “characterized as ‘marriages.’”  
Adams v. Howerton, 486 F. Supp. 1119, 1125 (1980).   
74
procreation rationale, Part V now turns to a more normative critique of 
counterfeiting rhetoric and to the future.  My objective in this Part is 
twofold.  Section A demonstrates that counterfeiting rhetoric—like the 
law more generally—continues to place sexual orientation minorities in 
a double bind in precisely that area of the law, domestic relations, where 
the double bind has operated to deny that group a panoply of rights.  
Section B, which is more prospective in purpose and scope, proposes 
what a “queer” reading of the ‘queer as counterfeit’ analogy might look 
like.   
 
A. Counterfeit, Imitation, and the Double Bind 
The counterfeiting analogy to same-sex relationships warrants 
criticism for three reasons.  First, and most obvious, same-sex 
relationships are not deceptive on their face.  Second, that analogy 
continues to place gays and lesbians in a pernicious double bind.  Third, 
and relatedly, that analogy perpetuates the discourse of fraud that has 
surrounded the legal construction of sexual orientation minorities for 
centuries. Remarkably, even some feminist lesbian theorists who 
believe that marriage is not “a path to liberation” for sexual orientation 
minorities251 have characterized same-sex marriage as a kind of 
imitation—albeit the imitation not of a superior product, but of an 
intrinsically flawed institution that perpetuates gender discrimination 
and heterosexist assumptions.  Professor Nancy Polikoff, for instance, 
has remarked that “I believe that the desire to marry in the lesbian and 
gay community is an attempt to mimic the worst of mainstream society, 
an effort to fit into an inherently problematic institution that betrays the 
promise of both lesbian and gay liberation and radical feminism.”252 
Polikoff is not alone among gay and lesbian theorists in advocating that 
the queer community shift its focus from the “unacceptably 
conservative” prospect of marriage to more “progressive” social 
concerns—concerns like universal healthcare “regardless of marital 
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status.”253 Nevertheless, her characterization of gays and lesbians’ 
desire to marry as a kind of mimicry in and of itself is noteworthy 
because it suggests that even those who would likely take issue with the 
conservative casting of same-sex marriage as counterfeit are thinking 
about same-sex marriage in terms of deceptive impersonation. 
 The language of mimicry and counterfeiting which has 
pervaded the same-sex marriage debate—on both sides—perpetuates the 
double bind in which the law routinely places sexual orientation 
minorities.  Counterfeiting rhetoric, along with the procreation rationale, 
places queers in a number of double binds.  For instance, by depicting 
‘selfish’ sexual orientation minorities as at once having an 
overabundance of economic capital (i.e., tangible resources) and a 
dearth of procreative capital (i.e., the ability to have true riches in the 
form of children), counterfeiting rhetoric places them in the impossible 
position of having too much and not enough.  Similarly, by at once 
emphasizing that same-sex couples cannot have children through sexual 
means and that they can bear children in a more responsible manner, the 
procreation rationale for same-sex marriage prohibitions places queers 
in the hopeless position of: (1) being thought of as both sterile (intra-
relationally speaking) and procreative (extra-relationally speaking); and 
(2) being both inferior and superior to their cross-sex counterparts in 
terms of procreative ability.  In this sense, the evolution of the 
procreation rationale itself perpetuates the double bind that 
counterfeiting rhetoric reflects.   
 The idea, though, that sexual orientation minorities are 
deceptive because they are attempting to mimic (and pass for) married, 
cross-sex couples and their families helps to perpetuate yet another 
double bind—one that has functioned most vigorously in the family law 
context.  The law routinely requires gay and lesbian parents to cover 
their sexual identity—or, more drastic, to pass as straight—should they 
desire to retain even limited custodial or visitation rights over their 
children.  While a ‘homosexual’ sexual orientation operates as a per se 
 
253 Judith Butler, Is Kinship Always Already Heterosexual?, in UNDOING GENDER 109 (2002) 
(“For a progressive sexual movement, even one that may want to produce marriage as an option 
for nonheterosexuals, the proposition that marriage should become the only way to sanction or 
legitimate sexuality is unacceptably conservative . . . .”); but see WILLIAM ESKRIDGE, JR., THE 
CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: FROM SEXUAL LIBERTY TO CIVILIZED COMMITMENT 5-6 (1996) 
(“For some, gay marriage is unnatural or abominable.  For others, it is an assimilative sellout.  
For me—and I hope for you after you read this book—same-sex marriage is natural and just”).   
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bar on custody and/or visitation in only a minority of jurisdictions,254 
homosexual ‘conduct’ that occurs in the presence of children—
including, but not limited to, displays of affection between same-sex 
partners—continues to operate as a significant factor in custodial and 
visitation decisions in a majority of jurisdictions.255 As Yoshino has 
observed, most courts not only regularly penalize gay and lesbian 
parents for failing to cover, but some courts have even “articulated a 
standard that suggests that the [gay or lesbian] parent must convert.”256 
In the custodial and visitation context, then, gay and lesbian parents are 
effectively required to self-counterfeit—that is, required to assume the 
very traits or qualities of mimicry and counterfeit that same-sex 
marriage opponents appear to despise most.   
 Moreover, in some jurisdictions, same-sex parents (or single 
gays and lesbians) are ineligible to adopt because they cannot “pass” for 
cross-sex parents.  For instance, in In the Matter of the Adoption of: 
Charles B., the Court of Appeals of Ohio found that “homosexuals” 
were barred from adopting under that state’s adoption law even though 
sexual orientation did not operate as an explicit statutory bar to 
adoption.257 In refusing “[t]o impute to the legislature . . . an intention 
to make homosexuals eligible to adopt,”258 the court invoked the very 
language of passing to express its belief that gay parents could not 
“imitate” and “pass for” cross-sex families because “homosexuals” 
could not sexually procreate: 
 
Homosexuality negates procreation.  Announced 
homosexuality defeats the goals of adoption.  It will be 
impossible for the child to pass as the natural child of 
the adoptive “family” or to adapt to the community by 
quietly blending in free from controversy and stigma.  A 
principle inherent in adoption since Roman days is 
 
254 Yoshino, supra note ______, at 858-59 & n.497 (listing Florida as the only state with a 
statutory per se bar and citing cases in other jurisdictions, including Kentucky, Missouri, North 
Dakota, Oklahoma, and Virginia, where courts have found that “homosexuality alone is a per se 
reason for denying custody or visitation rights”).   
255 See id.
256 Id. at 862.  
257 In the Matter of the Adoption of: Charles B., 1988 Ohio App. LEXIS 4435 (Ohio App., 5th 
App. Dist. Oct. 28, 1988).   
258 Id. at *5.  
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“adoptio naturam imitatur,” adoption imitates nature.  
The fundamental rationale for adoption is to provide a 
child with the closest approximation to a birth family 
that is available.259 
More recently, in Lofton v. Secretary of the Department of Children and 
Family Services, the Eleventh Circuit upheld Florida’s law that 
prohibited “homosexual” persons from adopting partly on the rational 
basis that adoptive households should “resemble the nuclear family as 
closely as possible.”260 
The criticism that same-sex couples are unable to pass (or 
cover)  that emerges from these cases conflicts with the more general 
criticism that sexual orientation minorities are deceptive because they 
do often pass (or cover).  For instance, in Weigand v. Houghton, the 
Supreme Court of Mississippi upheld a lower court’s decision refusing a 
gay father’s petition for custody partly on the basis that the father did 
not engage in “open sign[s] of affection” with his partner in front of his 
child; rather, the father “merely retreat[ed] behind closed and locked 
door, hiding and secreting his own sexuality from Paul.”261 While 
Yoshino reads the Wiegand court’s statement as a covering demand that 
is “tantamount to a demand for conversion,”262 we might also read it as 
a criticism that rests on the father’s deceptiveness and that at least 
implies that he is being dishonest by “hiding and secreting” his 
authentic self and instead impersonating someone else in front of his 
son.  Of course, if the father did not engage in this kind of self-
counterfeiting, the court would likely have found that he was not 
covering enough.  Suffice it to say here, though, that as with the 
deployment of counterfeiting rhetoric (or the language of mimicry more 
generally) by opponents of same-sex marriage, the judicial treatment of 
gay and lesbian parents in the custodial context perpetuates a double 
bind that casts sexual orientation minorities as both fraudulent (i.e.,
259 Id. at *6 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).   
260 358 F.3d 804, 818 (11th Cir. 2004).  For the conceptualization of adopted children as 
artificial versions that must be ‘naturalized’ into the adoptive family, see Naomi Cahn, Perfect 
Substitutes for the Real Thing?, 52 DUKE L.J. 1077, 1144 (2003).   
261 730 So.2d 581, 586 (Miss. 1999).   
262 Yoshino, supra note ______, at 863.   
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attempting to pass) and not fraudulent enough (i.e., refusing or being 
unable to pass).  
 
B. Queering the Double Bind 
 
Is there a way to recast the counterfeiting analogy to same-sex 
relationships—and the freight of negative connotations that the very 
term, “counterfeit,” bears—in a positive way and put it to constructive 
use?  In a sense, the protestors who launched the Queer Dollars 
Campaign in Cleveland have done precisely that by co-opting the very 
stereotype of ‘queer as counterfeit’ and turning it back on itself as a 
form of political protest.  That is, the Queer Dollars Campaign quite 
literally returned the pejorative ‘queer as counterfeit’ metaphor or 
trope—the latter of which denotes the turning away of a word from its 
original meaning263—back to its origins.  On a certain level, the 
Campaign’s political strategy was quite ingenious: at the same time that 
the queer activists were announcing or  revealing themselves as “queer” 
in the sense of counterfeit, they were symbolically passing “queer” or 
counterfeit currency.  Their strategy therefore involved a simultaneous 
process of ‘outing’—outing themselves as well as the origins of the very 
stereotype that they were enacting—and ‘passing.’  But the Campaign 
took it one step further still: by publicly staging or performing what is 
typically considered to be a deceptive act of passing—be it the passing 
of counterfeit currency or the passing of one’s sexual identity—the 
activists were undoing the very act that gave rise to the ‘queer as 
counterfeit’ stereotype in the first instance.   
 In his seminal piece on covering, Professor Yoshino chooses 
“the word ‘queer’ to denominate ‘gays who refuse to cover,’” that is, to 
downplay their sexual identity.264 While noting that such a definition 
“represent[s] precisely the essentialization of sexual identity that [queer 
theorists] resist,”265 Yoshino nevertheless observes that “[i]n popular 
parlance, . . . the perception that ‘queers’ are gays who refuse to cover is 
common, not least because normals have cast them in these terms.”266 
263 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note _____, at entry for trope: n.
264 Yoshino, supra note _____, at 839.  
265 Id.
266 Id. Yoshino defines “normals” as “a group of people who are openly gay, but who seek to 
cover their sexual orientations, emphasizing their commonality with straights.”  Id.
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Yoshino’s definition of “queer” is noteworthy and of particular 
relevance here because it highlights an additional aspect of the ‘queer as 
counterfeit’ analogy that this Article has not discussed but that inheres 
in the very idea of a “queer” three dollar bill, namely, the fact that 
“queer” connotes something that is “strange” or “unusual”267—that is, 
something whose eccentricity and deviation from the norm (say, a one 
or a five dollar bill) calls attention to itself.  Earlier I suggested that the 
slang phrase, “queer as a three dollar bill,” cannot simply convey 
counterfeit in the sense of deceptive because everybody knows that a 
three dollar bill is a fake when they see one.268 Part of what makes 
“queers” different from “normals,” it would seem, is that their “refusal 
to cover” is accompanied by a sense that they are flaunting their so-
called deviation from the norm and thereby forcing the public to take 
account of the fact that they are three dollar bills. At first blush, then, 
these two senses of queer—queer as counterfeit and queer as strange—
are in disharmony and appear to perpetuate the double bind in which 
sexual orientation minorities are routinely placed: whereas the former 
sense of queer connotes covert deception (i.e., passing and/or covering), 
the latter sense of queer connotes visible difference (i.e., outing and/or 
flaunting).   
 The Queer Dollars Campaign’s activists, however, effectively 
played on this disharmony (or dual sense of queer) by publicly 
foregrounding an identity that is routinely cast in deceptive, ‘counterfeit’ 
terms.  Their public staging and performative recasting of the ‘queer as 
counterfeit’ trope represents an example of what queer theorist, Judith 
Butler, might call ‘parodic performativity,’ that is, the process by which 
ostensibly essential, ontological categories like “sex and gender [are] 
denaturalized by means of a performance which avows their distinctness 
and dramatizes the cultural mechanism of their fabricated identity.”269 
Butler’s classic example of parodic performativity is drag, which, she 
suggests, complicates “the relation between the ‘imitation’ and the 
‘original’ by “play[ing] upon the distinction between the anatomy of the 
performer and the gender that is being performed.”270 Moreover, “[i]n 
 
267 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note _____, at entry for queer: n.
268 See supra notes ______, and accompanying text.  
269 JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY 138 (1990).  
270 Id. at 137.  
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imitating gender, drag implicitly reveals the imitative structure of 
gender itself—as well as its contingency.”271 In a similar vein, 
postmodern theorist, Jean Baudrillard, contends that an imitation or 
copy of an archetypal model has the power to displace the ontological 
primacy and basis of that model.  In Simulacra and Simulation,
Baudrillard writes that a simulation (i.e., an image or imitation) of 
reality (i.e., an ‘original’ form) undergoes a four-step process whereby it 
(1) “reflect[s] a profound reality;” (2) “masks and denatures a profound 
reality;” (3) “masks the absence of a profound reality;” and (4) “has no 
relation to any reality whatsoever: it is its own pure simulacrum.”272 
Baudrillard’s theory of simulation—and the simulacra that simulation 
produces—recalls Butler’s theory of the process by which drag (and 
other varieties of parodic performance) reveals not only the “absence” of 
the “reality” of sex and gender, but their imitative structure as well.    
 How might Butler and Baudrillard’s respective theories of 
performative imitation and simulation—each of which is far more 
comprehensive than my cursory analysis here permits—supply us with a 
lens through which to consider the productive possibilities of the 
counterfeiting analogy to same-sex relations?  Fortunately, the Queer 
Dollars Campaign has already provided us with an instance where the 
queer and postmodern theories casually discussed here have been put 
into practice.  Where same-sex marriage opponents, commentators like 
Professor Dent, and even some radical queer theorists regard same-sex 
marriage as mimicry, fraudulent, a counterfeit, a “mocking burlesque,” a 
“mere parody,” and a “caricature of the real thing,”273 the Queer Dollars 
Campaign’s queer activists understood the fertile, performative 
possibilities of that very “counterfeit” or “parody.”  Moreover, where 
the Queer Dollars Campaign performatively enacted (and, in the 
process, ‘undid’) the double bind of the “queer as a three dollar bill” 
counterfeiting trope, we might imagine a situation where the 
counterfeiting trope that has been applied to same-sex marriage (and 
same-sex reproduction) might similarly be turned on itself.  Perhaps 
queer activists might publicly stage a wedding while putting counterfeit 
dollars into the Salvation Army’s kettles—revealing that marriage, like 
 
271 Id. (italics in original).  
272 JEAN BAUDRILLARD, SIMULACRA AND SIMULATION 6 (trans. Shelia Faria Glaser) (1995) 
(italics in original).  
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money, is an eminently imitable construct that earns its legitimacy from 
the law that ‘so orders’ it.  Marriage—like sex, gender, whiteness—
might emerge as no more naturally given than the counterfeiting rhetoric 
that supports it.  To mimic marriage in this way is not to suggest that 
marriage is a bad thing or that queer activists should refocus their 
energies on less “conservative” causes. Rather, all it means is that same-
sex marriage opponents have reminded us that marriage is a product or 
fungible good that can be counterfeited—one whose exchange value is 
determined by the law and whose form lends itself to daring imitative 
possibilities.  In this sense, counterfeiting rhetoric reveals the power of 
its own transformative potential.   
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This Article has considered the historical relationship between 
unorthodox sexual/reproductive practices and counterfeiting in order to 
suggest the following: just as counterfeiting rhetoric rests on the same 
logic that shores up the procreation rationale for same-sex marriage 
prohibitions, so, too, does the procreation rationale rest on the same 
logic that shores up counterfeiting rhetoric.  Understanding how the 
counterfeiting analogy and the procreation rationale for same-sex 
marriage prohibitions intersect with each other helps to explain what is 
driving each. How can same-sex marriage opponents possibly 
characterize same-sex marriage as counterfeit?  Because same-sex 
couples both engage in non-procreative sex and are having families 
through artificial means that allow them to pass for the real thing.  
Similarly, why has the procreation rationale been so successful in recent 
same-sex marriage litigation if that rationale, in whichever form it has 
assumed, is so logically flimsy?  Because both homosexual sex and the 
kind of families that same-sex couples quite literally ‘reproduce’ are 
considered to be fraudulent ‘reproductions’ of the real thing—
reproductions which, in turn, attempt to pass for the real thing.  
 Earlier I suggested that we view the evolution of the 
procreation rationale for same-sex marriage prohibitions through the 
interpretive lens of Reva Siegel’s theory of “preservation-through-
transformation,” that is, the theory that status hierarchies are maintained, 
in part, because the “justificatory rhetoric” that supports them evolves 
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over time to assume a kinder, gentler tone.274 Commenting on Siegel’s 
theory, Yoshino has remarked that “[p]reservation-through-
transformation does not foreclose the possibility of real social change.  
Nor does it assume bad intent on the part of the individual legal actors.  
It does, however, caution that progress narratives about status 
hierarchies should be approached with intense skepticism.”275 This 
Article has looked at the extent to which two such “progress 
narratives”—the evolution of the procreation rationale for same-sex 
marriage prohibitions and the rhetorical re-casting of gays and lesbians 
as society’s counterfeiters rather than disgust-inducing outcasts—have 
worked together to maintain a pre-existing status hierarchy based on 
sexual orientation.  Moreover, it has done so by turning to historical and 
literary narratives about the interrelationship among counterfeiting, non-
procreative sex, and miscegenation—the latter of which represents a 
fitting parallel to the fears surrounding marriage ‘mixing’ and ‘passing’ 
that have surfaced in the legal controversy over same-sex marriage.  As 
such, it has shown that historical and literary narratives provide us with 
the tools by which to channel the “intense skepticism” that progress 
narratives so often inspire and with which to challenge the rhetorical 
tropes that have become such an integral part of the way in which we 
justify certain status hierarchies that we barely even notice them.   
 
274 Supra note ______, at ______.   
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